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lNTRODUCTIO

Contract law generally is based on the principle that courts will enforce
agreements into which the parties freely entered. 1 If parties comply with
contract formalities, 2 the law typically provides relief in the event of a
breach. 3 The doctrine of illegal contracts, which allows parties to avoid
their obligations when a contract is "illegal"4 or against public
1. The earliest proponents of the voluntarism principle are classified as "will theorists,"
who engineered the rules of contract ro ensure that liability would attach only to those who
voluntarily assumed obligations. Barnett, ll. Consent Theory of Contract, 86 Con•~f. L. REv. 269,
272 (1986). Modern theorists who embrace the voluntarism principle do so on an expanded
basis. See generally Barnett, supra, and Kostritsky. A New Theory of Assent Based Liability Emerging
Unde·r the Guise of Promissory E.ltoppel: An Explanation and Defense, 33 WAYNE L. Rlv. 895 (1987).
The voluntarism principle has come under attack as an insufficient explanatory theory for the
results of contract law. For a persuasive study documenting the tension between voluntarism
and other competing public principles such as fairness, see generally Dalton, ll.n Essay in tlu
Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997 ( 1985).
2. For a discussion of the general characteristics and purposes of a system based on legal
formalities that have a "limited substantive content" and that are designed to facilitate private
agreements rather than to achieve any particular outcomes, see Kennedy, Form and Substance
in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. Rtv. 1685, 1687-1701 (1976). Such formalities "define
in advance a tariff that the pri\·ate actor must pay if he wishes to behave in a particular way.
The lawmaker does not care what choice the actor makes within this structure, but has an
interest in the choice being made knowingly and deliberately . . . ." ld. at 1694: see also
Feinman, Promissory E.1toppel and judicial 1Hethod, 97 HARV. L. REv. 678, 682 n.21 (1984)
(defining formalism); hiller, Consideration and Fcrnn, 41 Cott:M. L. R£v. 799 (1941) (discussing
characteristics of legal formalities and their functions in context of consideration requirement).
3. See E.A. FARSSWORTH, CosTRACTii § 1.1, at 3 (1982). The Restatement (Second) of Contracts
defines a contract as "a promise or set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a
remedv ....'' REsTATE>~E>:T (SEcoso) OF CoNTRACTS§ I (1981); see also E. Mt.:RPHY & R. SPEIDEL,
Srum£; h Co:-<TRACT LAw I ( 1984). Of course, the theoretical right to full contractual relief may
be quite limited in practice, due to the mitigation and foreseeability doctrines as well as other
principles limiting recovery. See, e.g., P.S. ATIY.-\Ji, THE RisE Asu F.\LL oF Far.woM or CosTRACT
424-25.431-34 (1979); G. GJL\IORF,, THE Dr..nw or Co:-<TRAcT 15 (1974).
4. Jn one sense an "illegal contract" is a "self-contradictory" term. 6A A. CoRllt:<,
Co:o-;TRACTs § 1373, at I (1962); see also Strong, The Enforceability of Illegal Contracts, 12 HAsTINGs
L.J. ;H7, 347 (1961). This is because illegal contracts are unenforceable by definition. Thus,
illegal contracts are not contracts in the strict sense, since they lack one of the essential
elements of a true contract: the availability of a remedy for breach. Accordingly, Dean Wade
suggested that the term "illegal bargain" replace the term "illegal contract." Wade, Benefus
Obtained Under Tllegal Transactions - RNISons For and Against Allowing Restituti(m, 25 TF.x. L. REv.
31, 31 (1946).
In addition to this definitional inconsistency, " 'illegality' is not a simple concept." 6A A.
CoRsi:-.:, supra, § 1374, at 4. The usual definition of an illegal contract is a contract whose
enforcement would contravene a public policy proclaimed by a legislative or judicial body. Jd.
at 5-6: see also E.A. FARNswoRTH, supra note 3, § 5.2, at 330-31, § 5.5, at 347 (1982). Obvious
violations of public policy include contracts that offend a legislative statute or constitutional
provision, whether it be criminal or otherwise. Illegality in the contracts area also extends to
activities that may not ordinarily be considered "illegal" because they are not sanctioned by a
penalty other than judicial nonenforcement. E.A. FARNswoRTH, supra note 3, § 5.1, at 327.
Sources of contractual illegality include violations of the common law and of community
norms. 6A A. CoRBI:'I, supra,§§ 1374-1375; see also infra note 5.
The degree of nexus to the illegality that will cause courts to deny relief to the contracting
parties varies. The nexus may he quite direct as when the performance given as consideration
is offensive to puhlic policy in and of itself. 6A A. CoRstN, supra, § 1373, at 2. An example of
this type of illegal contract is a promise by ll. to commit murder in return for a payment by B .
The consideration given by both parties to this contract is inherently illegal. The performance
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policy,5 is a rare limitation on freedom of contract. 6
promised by A is unlawful by itself because murder is prohibited by statute, and the promise
by B is inherently wrong because "the promise (of payment] is one that tends to induce the
other party to engage in such conduct." E.A. FAR~swoRTH, supra note 3, § 5.1, at 329; see aL1o
RrSTATEME"T (SF.WND) or Co"TRACTS § 192 (1981) ("A promise to commit a tort or to induce the
commission of a ton is unenforceable on grounds of public policy."). Other contracts are illegal
because the actual agreement violates public policy and thtlS is unenforceable even though the
consideration, either given or promised, is completely legal in and of itself. For example, a
contract between two merchants to sell a specified product for $100 may be illegal because it
violates statutes prohibiting anticompetitive agreements, even though there is nothing
inherently wrong with the individual performances of each merchant selling a product for
$100. 6A A. CoRs'"· supra, § 1373, at 2 (discussing this example). A contract also may be
labelled illegal, despite the fact that both the actual agreement and the performances given as
consideration are. perfectly legal, "by reason of the wrongful purpose of one or both parties in
making it." !d. § 1518. at 744. Such is the case when A rents a hall toBin return forB's
pa•nw1H of r~n1, but }I <'llt~r<- tllf n~r<'~menL 1\l{h thl' nlll'nli< 1. .1 usme, til<' Ullll(llllQ; l<.r .l
pn•lulHtt:d purr•·''. 'u<h a~ ~amhm1~- -\~ h,lh "ther tvp~s of agrl'l"m.-nr~. rhe Jlld .••.d
11 '"·'"'-''l.t of tht> plOI!IhGr ''h.. tlllt'll<kd ''· :.. hin c ;m unbwful purp<><<' .aod the promi<n'
"ho <'T.tcrt,lllt<'d 11•• 'uth put)· \ t ' ; complt•x It .·1 doe~ IJC•t ~now of B' dlt:..(.il purpo<r. ~h<' i~
pnnuttedt• .-m-<tcerhr,omr .I.TI1.5f·'Rr<T.<ll••rq St.J''

.IC0~TR\I.rs~<il7~,1'2

J~.-;-~IJ:

infra text accompanying notes 81-89.
Thus, the threshold question of whether a contract is illegal presents difficult legal questions
which this Article will not attempt to address. For an extended treatment of the various ways
in which contracts may be illegal, see generally Furmston, The Analysis of lllegal Contracts, 16 U.
ToRONTO L J. 267 (1966). It will focus instead on wh ether, and to what extent, the court will
lend its aid to any of the parties and develop rationales for this differemiated treatment.
5. Courts have recognized diverse public policies that merit the protection of the illegal
contracts doctrine. See generally Winfield, Public Policy in tJr.e English Common Law, 42 H.'\lW. L.
REv. 76 (1928). Commentators have grouped the public policies according to certain
fundamental norms such as (l) a morality principle, (2) an economic liberty interest, (3) an
interest in honest government and judicial integrity, and (4) fiduciary responsibilities. 6A A.
CoRn'"· supra note 4, §§ 1373-1517; E.A. FAR,;swoRTH, supra note 3, § 5.2, at 331-32. For
example, courts reluctant to as5ist contracts that offend moral values refuse all relief to parties
under bargains that harm family relationships or promote gambling. Se.e, e.g., Kyne v. Kyne,
16 Cal. 2d 436, 438, I 06 P.2d 620, 621 (1940) (gambling); E.A. F.~RNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 5.4,
at 341-47 (family). Courts concerned with economic liberty values condemn restrictive
covenants, anticompetitive agreements, and property alienation restrictions. E.A. FARNswo~TH,
supra note 3, § 5.2, at 331-32. For a discussion of the antirestriction policy see .Korngold, For
Unifying ServittuleJ and Defeasible Fees: Property Law's Functional Equivalents, 66 TEx. L REv. 533,
542-43 (1988); see aL1o McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 669-70 (1898) (anticompetitive
bidding agreement); Richard P. Rita Personnel Servs. lnt'l v. Kot, 229 Ga. 314,317, 191 S.E.2d
79, 81 (1972) (restrictive covenant unenforceable); cases cited infra note 65. Courts also are
loath to enforce contracts that harm government, or that corrupt public officials. See, e.g.,
United States v. Mississippi Valley Co., 364 U.S. 520, 566 (1961) (contract illegal and
government could disaffirm because of conflict of interest). Concerns with fiduciary responsibilities have prompted courts to condemn directors' agreements to vote or act in ways that
limit their discretion t<> act in the interests of the corporations' shareholders. Set, e.g., Chapin
v. Benwood Found., 1nc., 402 A.2d 1205, 1211 (Del. Ch. I 979) (succession agreement
unenforceable because directive to fill vacancies with particular people restricts exercise of best
judgment); cases cited in 6A A. CoRBlN,supra note 4, § 1454; see also E.A. FARJ.,-swoRTH, supra note
3, § 5.2. at 332 n.14.
These policies, of course, are subject to criticism on the ground that it is impossible to
establish them as "suprahistorical norms transcending time and space," Gordon, Historicism in
Legal Scholarship, 90 Y,\l.E L.J I 017, 102.? ( 1981), and thus impossible to immunize the chosen
policies from criticism. See also Leff. Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DL•Kr. L.J. 1229,
1240 ("Tl~RTe is no such thing as an unchallengeable evallUI!ive system.").
This Article, however, does not attempt tO justify the policies; it accepts the policies as
fundamemal givens. 1t focuses instead on how judges apply the nonenforcement doctrine to
promote these policies and in this respect parallels the instrumentalism of law and economics.
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Courts have claimed that they effectuate these public policy concerns
by characterizing illegal contracts as "void"7 and denying them all legal
effect.B They have indicated that withholding judicial relief deters illegal
"[Law and economics] is, however, limited. It can work only by presupposing that law, and the
significance of law, are w be determined and judged instrumentally, with reference w more
or Jess deliberately chosen purposes .... " Michel man, Reflections on Professional Education, Legal
Scholarship, and the Law-and-Economtcs Movement, 33 J. Lr.cAJ. Eovc. 197, 209 ( 1983); sec also M.
HoRwtTz, TttE TR.,~SFOR>t.ntm: oF Am.RrcA:-; LAw 17R0-1860, at 253-66 (1977) (discussing the
characteristics of instrumentalism that distinguish it from formalism).
6. The doctrine "touch[es] upon matters of substance related to the public welfare rather
than aspects of the bargainin!( process between the partzes." REsTATBfE~T (SF.co~o) OF CoNTRACTS ch. R
introductOry note (1979) (emphasis added). Withholding enforcement of contracts that violate
public policy is one arena in which commentators have proclaimed contract law's public
a~pects-that "certain state interests [are] legitimate limitations on individual freedom."
Dalton, supra nOle I, at 1010. Professor Dalton undoubtedly would consider this open
acceptance of public policy limits unusual, given the typical hostility to public intrusions into
private contracting. See generally Dalton, supra note 1. But .tee i1ifra text accompanying notes
34-49, 195-200 (suggesting that once public goals of doctrine are accepted, the doctrine may,
at least in some of its applications, be more compatible with autonomy principle than at first
appears).
7. The use of the word ''void" to describe the consequences of an illegal contract is
commonplace but not particularly useful. Professor Farnsworth suggests that because the
word is replete with uncertainty as to its meaning, it is "more accurate ro say that the
agreement or some part of it is unenforceable by one or both parties than to say that it is
'void.' '' E. A. FAR:o;swoRTH, supra note 3, § 5.1, at 327. Its "commonly intended" meaning is the
"total absence oflegal effect." I A. CoRBt~, supra note 4, § 7, at 15. The absence oflegal effect
prcsumablv would mean that nonenforcement remedies such as rescission and restitution (had
there becu J•·trti:.lpc· rl0rm~nccl w~>uld ],,: ;t,·..tilabk tt. cn<·,.r b•>th partie< thou,.(h uttorcem('nt
would be un·,,· ,i.~! ]('. Coun' :ttt:H·It difft'tln~ tn!NJ.lrl'l:tfl ''" w the'"'~'~! "\'(ltd, · lto"·e\(·r tH 1
all <)f wh1< h .m· c·qut,al~nr to nv let.:<~l effe((. Th •'· nu '' coutr\ "onld dt·m· rc~cr~siun ;,ucl
restitution as well as enforcement.
8. An early case applying the no-effect rule involved a partnership of two highwaymen.
In that case one partner sued for an accounting, but once the illegal nature of the venture
became apparent, the case was dismissed. Everet v. Williams, Mich. T. 12 Geo. 1. 1725 (No.
43), discussed in 9 L.•w. Q. Rn·. 197 (1893).
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts has adopted this no-effect principle by providing
generally that neither enforcement nor restitutionary remedy is available to parties to illegal
contracts. Section 178 addresses the enforcement aspect: "A promise or other term of an
agreement is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if legislation provides that it is
unenforceable or the interest in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by
a public policy against the enforcement O{ SUCh ter ms." RESTATEMF.NT (SECO~D) O f CO~TR.\CTS
§ 178(a) (1979). Section 197 addresses the denial of restitutionary remedies: "[A] pany has no
claim in restitution for perfonnance that he has rendered under or in return for a promise that
is unenforceable on grounds of public policy .... " ld. § 197.
The d isinclination to enfot"ce o1· otherwise lend j udicial support to contracts that contravene
some public policy seems antithetical to a major tenet of the classical system of contract Jaw:
namely, that courts should enforce whatever agreement the parties have consemed to without
regard to its substantive fairness or other public concerns. Su Feinman , Critical Approaches to
Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 829, 831-32; Metzger & Phillips, The Emergence of Promissory
Estoppel as an bukpendmt Theory of Recovery, 35 Rt'TGER~ L. REv. 472, 475-78 (1983) (disinclination to scrutinize contract for fairness is characteristic of classical system).
If the classical view is accepted, the illegal contracts rule, and the judicial imerference with
private agreement (in the sense-of denial of effect) which accompanies it, seem to constitute
exceptions to the general principle of noninterference with the "private ordering." Feinman,
StLpra, at 832. Professor Farnsworth emphasizes this view of the illegality limit as a public,
regulatory mechanism when he states: "Occasionally, however, a court will decide that the
public interest in freedom of contract is outweighed by some public policy and will refuse to
enforce the agreement .. .." E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 5.1, at 325-26; see also 6A A.
CoR!IIN, supra note 4, § 1376, at 20 ("[T]he very fact that a chapter on 'legality' of contract must
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contracts because parties will shun unenforceable transactions.9 While the
be written shows that we have never had and never shall have unlimited liberty of contract .... "); Winfield. supra note 5, at 82-83 (""[In Coke's] Reports. he states a resolution of the
court that the law will never make an interpretation to ad\·ance private interests and to destroy
public good.").
If, however, one accepts the criticism that the autonomv model is an idealized fictional
construct that is belied by the recognition that "[contract law) is like legislative action: [both]
necessarily involve public policy judgments in imposing legal liability," Feinman, supra, at 834,
the public nature of the illegal conn·acts doctrine would appear to be compatible with contract
doctrine rather than an exception to it. See also Dalton, mpra note I, at I 010 (discussion of
public nature of contract law); Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1717-22 (same). A recognition of the
public aspects of contract law would lead to an CJ<panded view of the jurliciary's role. A
restricted view, however, including a disinclination to impose public limits on the bargain, .1ee
Feinman, supra, at R32; Metzger & Phillips, sujJra, at 478-79, would folio"" naturally only if one
conceptualizes contract law as a ·'field of private ordering in which parties [create] their own
law by agreement." Feinman, supra, at 831-32 n.lO (citing O.W. Ho1.~1rs , THE Co~J\10" LAw
299-303 (1881)).
But regardless of whether contract law is conceptualized as exclusively private or public in
nature, conceptualizing the illegal contracts doctrine as an exceptional public limitation on the
freedom of contract may be an overstatement. The illegal contracts rule obviously is "public""
in the sense that courts refuse to enforce private agreements. otherwise meeting the formal
criteria, which are believed to harm society. Operation of the rule, however, also may be
"private" in the sense that courts, in applying the illegal contracts rule, attempt to reproduce
market decisions. See infra text accompanying notes 34-49. Assuming that the loss imposed by
the nonenforcement rule is a cost of contracting, courts may seek to replicate the riskallocation structure of that cost which the parties would have agreed to through unencu mbered private bargaining-the "would-be" bargain. Su Kennedy, Distributit>e and Paterna.li5t
Moti<>es in Contract and Tort Law, with Speda.l References to Compu.l.wry Terms and Unequal
Bargaining Power, 41 Mn. L. REv. 56:3, 599 (1982); ue also infra text accompanying notes 34-49.
For an analysis of one substantive doctrinal area-the duty to perform in good faith- based on
the risk allocation that would have occurred, see Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law
Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 H.-~Rv. L RF.v. 369, 378-94 {1980). Professor Kronman
examines judicial treatment of mistake in contracting from this vantage point of reproducing
risk allocations. See Kronman, MistakR, Disclosure, Infonnatiort, and the lAw of Contracts, 7 J. L EG.• L
STL'o. 1, 2-9, 18·27 (1978): see also Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resomu Allocation and Liability
Rules-A Comment, 11 J.L & EcoN. 67, 69 (1968) (discussing barriers to optimal resource
allocation). Courts should apply the illegal contracts doctrine using some of the same
principles-including efficient risk allocation-that they use in deciding ordinary contraCt
questions. Some critics would dispute the ability of courts to determine what risk allocation the
parties would ha,•e agreed to, arguing that these determinations necessarily involve value
choices. See generally Kennedy, supra; see also Halpern, Application of the Docttine of Commercial
Impracticability: Searchingfor "The Wisdom of Solomon," 135 U. PA. L. Rtv. 1123, 1159-60 (1987)
(pointing out "problems created ... when one must examine each case ex post to make an
economic determination of which party had 'control' or which party might have been better
able to 'spread' or 'bear' the consequences of the event").
9. s~e McMullen V. Hoffman, 174 L'.S. 639 (1899):
The more plainly parties understand that when they emer into contracts of this
nature they place themselves outside the protection of the law, so far as that
protection consists in aiding them to enforce such contracts, the less inclined will they
be to enter into them. In that way the public secures the benefit of a rigid adherence
to the law.
/d. at 670; see also Gellhorn, Contracts and Public Policy, 35 Cou·~t. L. REv. 679, 680 (1935);
Shand, Unblinkering the Unruly Horse: Public Policy in the Law of Contract, 30 CAMBRIC>GE L.J. 144,
152-53 (1972); Wade, supra note 4, at 48.
Courts also offer various other rationales for denying effect to or treating as void otherwise
valid contracts. They explain the hands-off policy on the basis of a perceived need to (I)
regulate contractual morality and (2) keep the courts pure by denying u ndeserving litigants
judicial access. Shand, supra, at 148; Wade, supra note 4, at 42-44.
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courts have not articulated their reasoning clearly, commentators have
explained that because nonenforcement will be costly to the parties in terms
of wasted resources, 10 they will be careful to avoid proscribed transactions.11
Despite their broad declarations of the "no-effect" rules, the courts
vary their treatment of parties to illegal contracts. 12 Courts sometimes grant
a one-sided voidability right, giving one party the option either to affirm or
avoid his contractual obhgations, but deny any relief to the other party. 13
Courts also may grant a one-sided enforcement right. Additionally, in cases
in which one party has partly performed, courts may grant a one-sided
rescission right, plus restitution. 14 Finally, courts can deny enforcement but
The deterrence rationale assumes that "private parties will in fact respond to the threat of
the snnction of nullity by learning to operate the system." Kennedy. supra note 2, at 1699. This
is the same assumption that the classicists made regarding the ability of all comracting parties
to comply with the traditional formation wles. It was assumed that parties would be equally
able to comply with the requiremems of offer ano acceptance and consideration, and that a
failure to do so would signify a deliberate choice not to have contract law govern. Similarly, if
it can be assumed that "parties are responsive to the legal system;· id. at 1699-1700, then the
contract that violates a public policy should be denied effect, regardless of who is seeking
enforcement. This assumption, however. is open to serious question. See Havighurst, Book
Review, 61 YALE L.J. 1138, 1145 (1952) ("Mere denial of contractual and quasi-contractual
remedy rar·ely has a substantial effect in discouraging illegal conduct."); see also Gordon, wpm
note 5, at l 026 (realist model "as.~umes that the rules of appellate doctrine are instantly
incorporated in the incentive structures of individuals"); Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1699 ("real
as opposed to hypothetical legal actors may be unwilling cir unable to" "respond to the threat
of the sanction of nullity by learning to operate the system").
The theory of general deterrence provides that if the law allocates a cost of an undesirable
activity to the activity, that allocation will "create(] incentives to engage in safer activities." G.
CAuRRESI. THf. CoHs OF AcclDE:>:Ts 73 (1970): see also M. Pou~sKv, A~ hnoot:cTro~ To LAw A!'o
I · ,.., . u, -;-~.-;-~, 1I'U~~. 1rle~<nhlng h<.'- L1p _. ll. ~ 1i. :;I cil\ '"iii!. I> >.uuld unden,1kc co-;tl~t•nc·llr
tlc.oh·,j, t•• rc>,Kh mo<t eft"~<ir-nr nl!LH(·rnc 111 svstem l':tr ..dc.xJC~Ih. •keptiCJ'm about rlu:
.lclc'ITU.I dtc>fl\ of "irhhc,lciing C'llfiJICt"lll<'nl Ill~\ Jr .. IJ.l ,.,J.>l.t.ll IIH' marl..ed I';Ul:thdill Ill ,.,he.
law results, which weakens deterrence; deterrence is dependent upon judicial consistency.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 34-35 (explaining "costs" of illegal contracts).
11. Theoretically, all panies thereby will "invest time and energy in finding out" the
judicial consequences of illegality. Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1698 (discussing this principle as
it applies to knowledge of formation rules).
12. Set 6A A. CORBl:<, supra note 4, § 1373, at 2 ("[s]o it is with illegal bargains; their legal
effect varies with the character of the factor,; that cause them to be called illegal"). It is
understandable, therefore, that "(t)he certainty suggested by the expression of the [no-effect
rule] in many respects is illusory." Wade, Restitution of 13errcfits Acqui-red Through Illegal
Tran.ractions , 95 u. PA. L. R•v. 261, 262 (1947); ser also Gellhorn, S11pra note 9, at 683. For a
thorough discussion of the varied treatment given such contracts in different contexts, see
generally Strong, supra note 4; Wade, suj)ra note 4.
13. It is common in the area of securities law for courts or legislatures to grant voidability
rights to parties that justifiably lack knowledge of the wrongdoing. E.A. F..-~txswoRTH, supra note
3, § 5.9, at 364 n.7; see, e.g., 15 U .S.C. § 771 (1982) (authorizing rescission to innocent buyers
of securities sold not in compliance with registration provisions); see also infra note 65 (right of
rescission discussed in detail).
14. If a court finds that the agreement is unenforceable on public policy grounds, the
general rule also precludes a restitulionary recovery. "If a party is barred on [illegality) from
enforcing the other party's promise, he is usually also barred from getting restitution for any
performance that he has t·endered in return for the unenforceable promise." E.A. FARNSWOHH,
supra note 3, § 5.9, at 363. Numerous exceptions, however, permit claims for restitution: when
denial will result in "disproportionate fmfeiture," the parties are not of equal guilt, or one
party is "excusably ignorant." RESHTEM~:<T (St:co;.;v) OF CoNTRACTs§§ 197-199 (1979).
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grant rescission to both parties. 15 Commentators have detailed the various
qualifications to the no-effect rule 16 without offering a comprehensive
theory to explain why the exceptions exist and how they interrelate.l'
This Article offers a unified theory 18 that explains why courts, despite
15. Sometimes it is relatively easy to determine what legal effect, if any, a court is giving
a contract. In other cases, however. the posture of the lawsuit may produce an outcome but
leave man y unanswered questions. Thus, if A sues B, the court does not always tell you what
it would do in a suit by B, thus leaving unclear which of the options, d iscussed supra text
accompanying notes 13-15, the court would adopt.
16. See supra note 12.
17. This Article thus seeks a functional explanation for the various exceptions. Functional
theories assume certain predetermined goals and attempt to explain the legal rules and their
exceptions in terms of their ability 10 achieve those goals. In assessing the functional usefulness
of the rules, this Article focuses on the "operational effects," L. KAt"-'"· LEGA~ R£.-~us" AT Y .\LE
1927-1960, at 10 (1986), on various participants in contractual transactions. See aLw Hansmann, The Current Suue of Law-and-Economics Scholarship, 33 j. LEGAL Eol'c. 217, 231 (1983)
(discussing need for empirical showing of sensitivity of contract behavior to legal rules). For
another example looking at functionalism of legal rules, see Shand, supra note 9, at 156
(criticizing unrealistic assumptions regarding deterrence: " '[In] cases where the eventual
injury is unintended the deterrent effect may be slight.'"). In examining the likely effect of the
various forms of judicial relief, this Article adopts the law and economics approach of
detCTmining how the formulation of alternate legal rules will affect the real world. "That is,
economics leads the analyst to consider the ways in which the world will actually be different
if one legal rule rather than another is adopted.'' ld. at 226. This Article uses the ter m
"functionalism" differently than Professor Feinman. He describes functionalism as premised
"on a belief that legal development is controlled by social conditions." Feinman, TM Meamng
of Reliance: A Historical Perspective, 1984 W1s. L. REv. 1373, 1377 (1984) [hereinafter Feinman,
Meaningj. For an example of functional scholarship similar to that described by Professor
Feinman, see Metzger & Phillips, supra note 8, at 505 (discussing development of promissory
estoppel and modern social context). Although this Article agrees that social conditions,
including the average chat·acteristics of parties, may affect how principles are applied , it
disagrees with Feinman's and Metzger & Phillips's claim that the laws' responses to social
context necessarily entail an embrace of collectivistic over private values. Instead, this Article
seeks to accommodate certain core principles of private contract law with the realities of
human behavior without concluding that a concern with social context implies the triumph of
altruism. This effort is characteristic of what Professor Feinman denominates neoclassical
theory. Feinman, Book Review, 39 SnN. L. REv. 1537, 1538 (1987) [hereinafter Feinman,
Book Review] (reviewing H. CoLLJ:<s, T Hl LAw Or Co~TRACT (1986)).
Professor Michelman would classifv this effort as exolanatoJ'V theorv since it attemots to find
(I) a "descriptive law that can order the data, organize them into an elegant, trenchant,
parsimonious macropattern, and impart to them an 'implicit logic'; and (2) a hypothetical
causal model that can account for the patterning so far observed and predict the forms of its
extensions .... " Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L.
Rt:v. 1015, 1035 (1978). But see Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law, 15
Fu. ST. U.L. Rt:v. 195, 199 (1987) (questioning "seeming technocratic apparatus of rational
justification-suggesting that the miscellany of social practices we happen to have been born
into in this historical moment is much more than a contingent miscellany").
18. In assuming that a coherent framework can be found, this Article entertains the "chief
aim" of"mainstream legal scholarship": "that of rationalizing the t·eal, of showing that the lawmaking and Jaw-applying activities that go on in our society make sense and may be rationally
related to some coherent conceptual ordering scheme." Gordon, supra note 5, at 1018. Of
course, many scholars dispute the possibility of achieving concepmal ordering schemes
because of the essentially contradictory goals that we are pursuing: altruism and individualism.
See, e.g., Feinman, supra note 8, at 857; Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1685; Mensch, Freedom of
Contract as Ideology (Book Review), 33 STA~ . L. Rtv. 753, 758 (1981). In the illegal contracts
area, although it appears that we are committed to the contradictory goals of deterrence and
punishment. the manner in which they are administered often reveals a certain implicit
coherence of efficient deterrence. This Article, however, goes farther than merely "rationalto
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the compelling argument for deterrence, should not apply the no-effect
rule uniformly and why they should vary the type of relief according to the
factual setting. It posits that a graduated relief structure will maximize
efficient deterrence-allocating the risk of nonenforcement to the cheapest
cost avoider, rather than to both parties in all instances. 19 An efficient
deterrence scheme will preserve limited personal, judicial, and societal
resources without burdening legitimate transactions. Efficient deterrence
theory2° can guide the courts to the proper remedy in differing factual
contexts. Importantly, because efficient deterrence may mirror private
choices, it also establishes the illegal contracts doctrine as consistent with,
rather than an exception to, traditional freedom of contract notions
(referred to here as the autonomy principle).2 1
This discussion of illegal contracts joins the current debate about the
public vs. private nature of contract law. Some scholars portray many
contract doctrines as reflecting expanding incursions of collectivistic and
paternalistic notions which have begun to undermine 22 the essentially
private world 23 of traditional contract law.2 4 Other scholars rebut that
thesis, suggesting that even "modern" doctrines such as promissory estoppel, perceived to reflect substantive fairness concerns, 25 dovetail with a
regime of private autonomy. 2 r; The efficient deterrence theory suggests
that the illegal contracts doctrine is founded upon a private autonomy basis
previously unrecognized because of the exclusive emphasis placed on the
doctrine's public policy aspects. 27
izing" existing case law in terms of an underlying implicit framework. It suggests the adoption
of a normative framework based on efficient deterrence to be used in deciding cases to achieve
certain societal goals.
19. For scholarship de,·oted to demonstrating the importance of economic logic in
deciding common-law cases. see generally R. Pos~r_R, THE Eco~muc A~ALYsrs OF LAw (1986).
This mode of analysis has of course been criticized on various grounds. See {feneraflv Gordon,
supra note 5, at I 026 (criticizing its "highly simplified models of social reality"); Leff, Economic
Analysi1 of Law: Some Realism About Nommalism. 60 VA. L. REv. 451 (1974); Michelman, supra
note 5, at 209 (faulting this scholarship on a similar basis, arguing that "economic analyses of
legal choice are determinate only because the allowable motivational attributions are restricted
bv the economic understanding of human action"}. Professor Wade articulates a concern with
efficiency of outcome when he note~ a tendency in some states to permit ''a loser to recover
money lost in a gambling transaction [on the] belief that allowing recovery is a better
pre\·emative measure .... " Wade, supra note 4. at 56.
20. By "efficient" rules I mean those that achieve the courts' purposes, and in some cases
the parties' purposes, at the minimum aggregate cost. Although efficiency is not necessarily
the universal yardstick. it is appropriate to consider because of its societal benefits. See infra text
ac;<;Ompanying notes 41-43.
21. See infm notes 34-49.
22. Professor Gordon has described the purveyors of this deviant message of collecti,·ism
as successful in "hammering some tiny dents" in the armor of the traditional freedom of
contract autonomy model. Gordon, supra note 17, at 201.
23. Feinman, su.j;ra note R, at 831.
24. See generally Kennedy, supra note 8. For a detailed treatment of this dichotomy and an
exposition of the attempt to suppress the private aspect of contract, see Dalton, .mpra note l,
at 1010.
25. P.S. AmAH, supra note 3, at 7, 777.
26. s~e generally Barnett, supra note I; Farber & Matheson, Beyond PromLqory Estoppel:
Contract Law and thr "Invisible Handshake," 52 U. Crl!. L. REv. 903 (1985); Kostritsky• .mpra note
1.

27. ln illuminating the doctrine's comist.ency with autonomy principles, this Article does
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Section I describes the efficient deterrence theory and explores the
policy and societal goals that support it. 28 It also posits that, given certain
assumptions about human behavior,29 the efficient deterrence theory is
compatible with the autonomy principle rather than an exceptional public
policy_ limit on private agreement. 30 Section II documents the impact of
certain factual predictors on case outcome and reconceptualizes them in
terms of an efficient de terrence theory.31 Section III reexamines several
doctrinal exceptions to the no-effect rule: the antiforfeiture, the protected
class, and the collateralness doctrines. 32 It asserts that the doctrinal exceptions fail to account persuasively for the case law outcomes and then
suggests that the doctrines can be better explained in terms of efficient
deterrence. Section IV reexamines the efficient deterrence theory and
relates it to the principle of contract freedom. 33

II.

EFFICIENT DETERRENCE: SociAL PouciES AND PRIVATE At:TONOMY

Efficient deterrence theory seeks to minimize the costs resulting from
the nonenforcement of contracts. When an illegal contract is not enforced,
parties lose the economic resources that they allocated to an activity
calculated to maximize their respective self-interests. 34 It also is costly to
society because resources spent to enter or even perform a contract that is
of no effect could have been productively utilized elsewhere in the
economy.35
Parties to an illegal contract who recognize the risk and cost of
nonenforcement may explicitly allocate the cost among themselves to
reduce that cost. 36 Absent such an explicit bargain, the courts must make
that determination. When applying the illegal contracts doctrine they
not dimini~h the importance of public •·egulatory intervention in the definition of the policies.
Moreover, in some cases, for reasons to be explored later in this Article, even the application
of the doctrine seems rooted in public, not private, goals. See infra text accompanying notes
195-200.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 34-49.
29. See Kitch, The Intellectual Foundntions of"Law and Economics," 33 J. LECAL E!)l;c. 184, 187
(1 983).
30. See infra text accompanying notes 194-200.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 50-156.
32. Ste infra text accompauying notes 157-93.
33. Ste infra text accompanying notes 194-200.
34. An important premise is that society is composed of value maximizing individuals. This
assumption, of course, is subject to criticism on several grounds. "Individuals serve only as
'channels or locations where what is of value is lObe found.' Similarly. wealth maximization is
not egalitarian. It does not v;~lue persons, only productivity, just as utilitarianism values, not
persons, but only pleasure." K.ornhauser, A Guide to the P('rp!exed Claims of Efficiency in the Law,
8 HorsTR.' L Rrv. 591,600 (1980). Professors Kennedv and Michelm;~n criticize the model of
human behavior because of the "weak, highly plausible factual judgment that people tend
most of the time to act as though they had goals and were trying to achieve them - i.e., that
people are rational maximizers of satisfactions." Kennedy & Michelman, .in· Property and
Contract Efficient? , 8 HofSTRA L. RH·. 711. 713-14 (1980).
35. Cf. Coase, The Problem of Snrial Cost, 3 J. LAw & Eco;.;. 1, 33 (1960) (resources should be
allocated to uses that produce maximum social gain).
36. But sec Siri;~nni, The DevelofJing Law of Co11/ractual lmpmctica!Jility and Impossibility: Pari ! ,
14 lJ.C.C. L.J. :~0. 69 (1981) ("Parties may rationally decide not to allocate relevant risks."),
cited in Halpern, o~upra note 8, at 1165 n.l79.
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should allocate the loss to the cheapest cost avoider-the "superior risk"
bearer37 -if one exists. A superior risk bearer is the party to whom rational,
value maximizing parties would allocate a risk to reduce the cost of that
risk. 38 If it appears that neither party could avoid the cost more cheaply
than the other party, the courts should leave the parties where they are by
withholding all judicial aid. The courts should not incur the costs of loss
shifting if the loss falls on a party who is at least as deterrable as the other
party. The courts should identify the cheapest cost avoider by hypothesizing how two contracting parties would allocate a fl.}.ture risk of nonenforcement, assuming that each party would try to "minimize the joint costs" of
that risk. 311 In doing this the courts should consider factors such as relative
status, knowledge, degree of participation, and potential benefit from the
illegality.40 Unfortunately, the cases often do not reach the correct results
or fail to articulate an adequate theoretical basis.
The allocation of the cost to the party in the best position to be
deterred at the least cost pursuant to efficient deterrence theory will
produce several societal benefits. It will reduce the transaction costs of
negotiating to opt out of legal rules such as broad nonenforcement rules,
which may be inefficient as discussed above. 41 Moreover, it often will
penalize persons whose characteristics make them professionals with respect to the transaction, thus forcing them out of business. 42 Additionally,
allocation of loss to the cheapest cost a voider will promote the development
of a rule recognizing the varying abilities of parties to respond to the
deterrent effect of certain directives. It thereby will apply scarce judicial
37. Kronman, supra note 8, at 4 (identifying superior risk bearer as one who can "minimize
the joint costs" of an error): see a~w Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination ofthe BasiJ
o_f Contract, 89 Y.\I.E L.J. 1261. 1285 (1980) ("The least-cost bearer of any risk will presumably
agree to absorb the risks of regretted promises in exchange for an enhanced return promise.").
38. Kronman, supra note 8, at 4; see also infra note 39.
39. Kronman, supra note 8, at 4. Professor Halpern discusses this concept of risk allocation
in another context of impracticability. See Halpern, supra note 8, at 1160.
The efficiency analysis, whether in terms of 'superior risk bearer' or 'least-cost
bearer,' or more general efficiency criteria, is a determination as to how two
supposedly risk averse parties would have allocated the risk of disruptive events had
they been required specifically to do so and had their goal been an efficient, least-cost,
present transaction. What is involved is a complicated set of trade-offs relating to how
much each party would have been willing to pay to have the other assume the risk.
!d. (footnotes omitted). Professor Halpern criticizes this ex post determination, stating that
"(s]uch an analysis would seem to amount to little more than conjecture when used to
determine how the parties would h ave handled the risk of the disruptive event had they been
aware ofit."ld. at ll61.
40. For a discussion of the significance of the parties' relative knowledge, see infra text
accompanying notes 81-104. For examples of the kinds of constraints that may interfere with
the voluntariness of a party's actions, see infra notes 105-27. For a discussion of the
participation factor, see infra notes 133-44. See infra text accompanying notes 145-56 for a
discussion of the benefit factor, the incentive to commit violations, and the relative deterrent
effect on the parties.
41. See Kronman. supra note 8, at 4-5 (by imposing risk on "better information-gatherer
... an efficiency-minded court reduces the transaction costs of the contracting process itself");
Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Conrtacl Law: An Economic AnalysiJ, 6
J. Lr.GA l STU D. 83, 89 (1977) (explaining that adoption of efficient rules will save transaction
costs of parties having to negotiate efficient outcomes to replace inefficient rules).
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resources to people most likely to adjust their behavior to take account of
the directive and will reduce the resources needed to achieve the desired
level of deterrence. It also will prevent overdeterrence of legitimate
transactions, which may occur if the loss is allocated on a random basis to
the nonsuperior risk bearer. This misallocation may require some parties to
undertake expensive search costs to discover if, for example, their counterpart to a contract contemplates illegal transactions. 1 3
When one applies the efficient deterrence theory to the illegal
contracts cases, the doctrine of illegal contracts emerges as compatible with
the autonomy principle in most contexts, rather than as an extraordinary
interference with private agreement. Although the doctrine of illegal
contracts adopts substantive goals at the outset,44 and thus apparently is
unlike the ourelv "facilitative"45 rules of offer and acceotance designed in
theory to promote private exchanges,40 the efficient deterrence doctrine in
fact maximizes private welfare. Efficient deterrence theory posits that
courts decide whether to grant or deny relief by calculating how different
classes of persons will respond to the application of the no-effect rule and
at what cost. The courts' decisions would reflect how the contracting parties
would have allocated the risks of loss through private negotiation.
Thus, when there are no market imperfections47 between the parties,
the courts should adopt a "leave-the-parties-where-they-are" approach for
illegal contracts. Nonintervention then could be rationalized in terms of the
autonomy principle because the parties' failure to bargain represents a
deliberate decision that each should bear the loss equally.4 8 Judicial
intervention would upset this allocation. 49 On the other hand, if market
imperfections exist because one party lacks knowledge of the illegality,
there is a disparity in status or access to counsel, or the parties have an
ongoing or fiduciary relationship, the parties ate unlikely to bargain
43. See infra text accompanying notes 81 -89; see also infra text accompanying notes 18i-93
(discussing Kama.~ City case).
44. Professo1· Kennedy therefore would classify the illegal contract doctrine as a "legal
institution[] ... whose purpose is to prevent people fl'Om engaging in particular activities
because those activities are morally wrong or otherwise flatly undesirable." Kennedy, supra
note 2, at 1691.
45. Gordon, supra note 5, at 1025.
46. For a discussion of the ongoing bar.de between advocates of contract law's public policy
respomibilities and proponents of contract law'~ amonomy foundations, see supra note 8.
47. By "market imperfections" this Article refers to certain persuasive barriers to
contracting which prevent an explicit allocation of the risk of nonenforcement of the contract.
These persuasive barriers to contracting are discussed in the context of promissory estoppel in
Kostritsky, supra note I, at 940-49.
48. Professor Farnsworth would dispute the contention equating an absence of provisions
governing fmure contingencies with deliberate risk-taking with regard to such events. "In
contrast to the .. . fiction, which assumes that the parties have expectations concerning all
possible situations, is the likelihood that they give their 'limited attention' only to a limited
number of situations . ..." Farnsworth, Disputes Over Omission in Contracts, 6R CoLL'~I. L. REv.
860, 869-70 ( 1968), cit.ed in Halpern. SlLpra note 8, at 1156 n.l37.
49. This conclusion presumes that parties want to allocate such risks and wish to do w in
an "efficient" manner. But ur supra no te 34. The pitfalls of an attempt to divine such a
would-be bargain are explored by Professor Halpern, supra note 8, at 1160-6 1: JPf also
Hillman, An Analysis of the Cessation of Contracf11(1/ Relatiom. 68 CoRI'HL L. REv. 6 17, 626 (1983)
("The efficiency fonnulaticm is only of limited help ... because parties do not always allocate
risks efficiently,"), cited in Halpern, supra note 8. at 116 1 n. I59.
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explicitly to allocate the loss to the cheapest cost a voider. One party may not
know of the risk to be allocated, or misperceived trust may interfere with
explicit bargaining over possible disruptive contingencies. In these cases,
courts should intervene by permitting enforcement, rescission, or restitutionary recovery. Courts should deny any relief, however, when it is the
cheapest cost avoider seeking it. This would promote efficient deterrence
because it would raise the risks and costs of contracting for the cheapest cost
avoider by su~jecting her to liability but denying her the right to rescission
or enforcement. Allocating the costs in that fashion achieves the allocation
the parties themselves presumably would have reached in unrestricted
negotiation, and so facilitates private welfare maximization.

III.

STRliCGLING TO MAKE SENSE or THE F ACTuAL ExcEPTioNs:
A P AlTER

Is T

HERE

OF EFFI C IENT DETERRE CE?

The various factual exceptions to the no-effect rule elucidate best the
concept of efficient deterrence and loss reallocation.'>O Courts recognize
some of these exceptions explicitly, while in other cases the factors
implicitly affect outcome. Thus, despite illegality, a plaintiff may be able to
recover depending on (l) the relative status of the parties, 5 1 (2) the relative
knowledge of the parties,'>2 (3) the voluntariness of the parties' conduct, 53
(4) the degree of the parties' participation, 5 4 and (5) the relative benefit to
the defendant and to the plaintiff from the wrongdoing. 55 Scholars have
made no attempt to account for these exceptions in a comprehensive
theory. Instead, they have regarded each exception as a sui generis separate
phenomenon. An efficient deterrence theory helps unify the disparate
factual exceptions in the cases. 56 In deciding whether to aid a party and
50. Many of the exceptions can be rationalized as criteria that determine whether the
parties are of equal guilt. See, e.g. , Gabaldon, (./nc/ean Hands and SdfbzflU:ted Waund1: The
Significance of Plaintiff Conduct i11 Actions for Mi.~r~premiUztion Under Rule !Ob-5, 71 Mr~~- L. Rrv.
317, 344 (! 986) (expl;~ining that excusable i~norance and fraud exceptions "simply appear to
rcflcct the requiremelll of equal fault"): see also E.A. F.w:<swoRTH, supra note 3, § 5.9, at 365
("An exception is ... made in favor of a claimant not equally in the wrong with the party from
whom he seeks restitution.").
51. See infra text accompanying notes 58-80.
52. See itifra text accornpanyin~ notes 81-104.
53. For examples of the kind of consnaims that may interfere with the voluntariness of a
party"s actions, see i1ljra text accompanying notes l 05-27.
54. See infra text accompanying notes 133-44.
55. For a discussion of the benefit factor. the incentive to commit violations. and the
relative deterrent effect on the parties, see i1~{m text accompan)·ing notes 145-56.
56. Efficient deteJTence theory also rna>· help explain other factual exceptions not
examined in this Article. One such exception is the doctrinal exception for substantial
compliance in contracts for professional sen·ices made illegal because the party su ~ject to a
licensing requirement fails to obtain the requisite license. Ordinarily, the cases will arise in the
following posmre. The service professional will complete a job and sue for the unpaid contract
amount. T he recipient of the services will also sue, allegin~ that the contract is illegal because
of the plaintiffs failure to obtain a license and that it therefore is unenforceable and void. In
some cases the contractor who brings an action still mav be able to recover despite her
unlicensed status if the violation is a mere technicalilY, as when she is licensed at the outset of
the contract and has little difficulty procuring a re~ewal. See, e.g., Latipac, Inc. v. Superior
Court of Martin County, 49 Cal. Rptr. 6i6. 411 P.2d 564 (1966). In wch cases, the denial of
recovery might lead to ovC'rcaucious behavior in the license renewal procedure because even
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thereby reallocate a loss, courts should decide whether that party, and
others in its position, will be effectively deterred from engaging in the
illegal conduct in the future and, if so, at what cost.57

A.

The Relative Status of the Parties

Courts should favor the party with inferior status. 58 The term "status
those parties who take the license requirement seriously, but inadvertently allow the license to
lapse, will be penalized with the same force, by loss of a contract recovery, as if they had
deliberately flowed the law and been unable to meet the substantive requirements for the
license. To avoid that overdeterrence, the law permits recovery based on the substantial
compliance doctrine.
57, In its focus on the effect that the formulation of legal rules is likely to have on parties,
given their behavioral characteristics, this Article follows the lead of law and economics
scholars who have explored what effen the formulation of a legal liability rule is likely to have
on parties given their particular characteristics, including the characteristic of rationally
maximizing utility. See gew:rally Kitch, supra note 29, at 188 (Pt·ofessor Kitch posits that in
identifying the "strong regularity of human social behavior," law and economics has given us
tools "to analyze responses to laws.").
Perceptions about'how parties are likely to respond to legal rules, given their characteristics,
also h<WC affected the formulation and application of legal rules in the context of promissory
estoppel. Sec gcne,·all:y Bamett, supra note I, at 31 0-17; Farber & Matheson, suj)ra note 26, at
929-30; Kmt.rit~ky, snjn-tz note l. The attempt to combine doctrinal analysis with "the realities
of commercial practice," Feinman, Book Review, supra note 17, at 1538, including the realities
of "how real-world actors are likely to respond" to certain rules, Kostritsky, supra note I, at 964,
has been described as neoclassical theory. Feinman, Book Review, supra note 17, at 1538-39.
Despite the shared element of assent in ( 1) neoclassical and (2) law and economics scholarship
of a concern with behavioral characteristics, Professor Feinman would distinguish these
schools in terms of the relative importance of doctrinal categories in their respective systems.
The neodassicists still find that "the formulation of principle and doctrine . . . can be
significant." /d. at 1539. The law and economics scholars, however, attempt to "provide a
substitute for classicism" that "ignore[sl traditional doctrinal categories in favor of some
metaprinciplc that governs many cases ...." Jd.
5R. Status disparity here is meant to refer to parties "of a statically different order" and is
not meant to refer to a disparity "which is the product of a particular contingency." Ellinghaus,
In DF(tr1u of Uwnnscimwbility, 78 YAt.£ LJ. 757, 767 (1969). A disparity resulting from a
conting('ncy refers to a case in which a party of seemingly lower status obtains a temporary
nonrecurrent aclvantag~. Of course, even disparities that are the product of a "particular
contingency," such as e:o<tremely necessitotts fmancial cirntmstanc.es, may affect the co\trt's
attimde toward judicial relief.
Statm is a penuasive predictor of case outcome not only in the illegal contracts area, but also
in other cloctrinal developments in contract law. Status has fig ured p rominently in the
de,·elopmem and a pplication of unconscionability and other a,·oidance doctrines, the close
connected ness donrine in commercial paper, and the law of actionable nondisd osme. In each
of these areas, couns regularly have manipulated the result accord ing to the relative status of
the parties. The greater the disparity in status between the parties, the more likely it is that the
court will gr·ant 1·elief to the party with inferior status, whether it is in the form of enforcement
or avoidance. Alternatively, if the parties appear to be on a relatively equal footing, it is less
likely that either party will be afforded relief. See, e.g., Jones v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 256
A.2d 739 (Del. 1969} (emphasizing importance of disparity in status of parties in denying
lender holder in due course status); Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, 381 Mass. 284, 294, 408 N.E.2d
1370, 1377 (19RO) (refusing to find franchise contract unconscionable in view of franchisee's
"business experience and education"), cited in E. Mt:RPHY & R. SrFJil£L, supra note 3, at 74-79;
Ollerman ,._O'Rourke Co., 94 Wis. 2d 17, 288 N.W.2d 95 (1980) (emphasizing plaintiff's
nonexpert status in deciding whether nondisclosure was actionable fraud).
Equating status disparity with disparities in sophistication and knowledge has prompted the
development of disclosure obligations of brokers to their clients under the aegis of the shingle
theoq•. See, e.g., Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, I 39 F.2d 434 , 437 (2d Cir. 1943) (failure to
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disparity" is used here to denote some disparity in professional stature, as
when one party is an expert in the transaction, better educated, or
financially better off than the other party. A difference in professional
stature often creates a disparity because other differences, such as dispro-

disclose markup over market price held violative of federal securities laws because, inter alia,
broker-dealer "under a special duty, in view of its expert knowledge and proffered advice, not
to take advantage of its customers' ignorance of market conditions''), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786
(1944); see also L. Loss, Fv:-.-o.~ME~·TALS or SrcURITIES REct:t.ATJOs 951-58 (I 983) (discussing
strength of shingle theory). But see Karmel. Revisiting the Shingle, Fiduciary-Duty Theories,
N.Y.L.J ., Oct. 16, 1986, at 1, col. 1 (questioning continued strength of shingle theory in light
of recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions).
A variety of status disparities also have prompted courts to grant restitutionary and damage
recoverie.~ as well as avoidance relief to the p<tny with inferior status. See, e.g., BeynoJ1 v.
Garden Grove Medical Group, 100 Cal. App. 3d 698, 705, 161 Cal. Rptr. 146, 150 (1980)
(allowing employee to avoid clause violating public policy because "there was no evidence that
the agreement was negotiated by parties having a parity of bargaining strength"); Parsky
Funeral Home. Inc. v. Shapiro, 83 Misc. 2d 566, 570-71, 372 N.Y.S.2d 288, 293-94 (1975)
(gntnting consumer avoidance rights when funeral establishment breached statute by failing to
disclose price information to consumer, but denying funeral establishment comractual and
noncontractual recovery); J>erlmuth v. Scappy and Peck, Inc., 73 Misc. 2d 927, 931 , 343
N .Y.S.2d 40, 44-45 ( 1973) (granting consumer punitive damages due to defendant body shop's
charges exceeding statutorily authorized amounts); Best v. Arthur Murray Town & Country
Dance Club, 60 Misc. 2d 660, 662, 303 N.Y.S.2d 546, 549 (1969) (granting consumer
rest.itutionary recovery against dance company when contract violated statute, even though
statute silent on question of restitutionary recovery). In the Parsley, Perlmuth , and Best cases, the
losing party violated a statute. In Parsky the funeral establishment failed to furnish the wrinen
estimate required by statute, noncompliance with which could lead to (l) license revocations
andlor (2) criminal fines. 83 Misc. 2d at 569, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 292. In Best, the statute
prescribed the requisites for contracts "for instruction in physical or social skills" to be
enforceable. 60 Misc. 2d at 661, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 548. In Perlmuth the ordinance (1 ) set
maximums for storage charges of disabled vehicles, (2) prescribed forms for repair estimates,
and (3) banned fees for estimates to which the owner had not assented. 73 Misc. 2d at 929, 343
N .Y.S.2d at 43. In each case. however, the stamte did not resolve whether the statutorv violator
should be subject to the particular contractual or noncontractual relief sought by th~ winning
party. As Professor Gellhorn explains, the court must decide: "Should the courts then refuse
to lend their process tO actions upon contracts which, if executed, would violate the statute, or
should they hold that the penal sanction had been deemed sufficient by the legislature as a
punishment for one who <~cted contrary to the law?" Gellhorn, $ltfrra note 9, at 681. [n
determining the type of relief that it should provide ro claimants, the court is influenced by the
relative position of the parties. It could be argued that the above cases are not explic<tble in
terms of status. Rather, since the legislature has made only the defendant's conduct criminal
or the subject of other s<tnctions, it only makes sense to permit the "innocent party'' to recove1·
in contract or off the contract. Under this view, the courts do not manipulate outcome
according to status but merely give effect to the legislature's statutory scheme.
The ahsence of a legislative decision on contract relief, however, still necessitates a judicial
decision. Moreover, in other contexts in which the legislature prohibits conduct by only one
party, a court may deny relief to the party who has not violated the statute if the court finds
the nonviolator to be an active, knowing p<trticipant. See, e.g., Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74, 83-84,89-90 (S.D.N.Y. 196fl} (denying damage recovery to sophisticated investor who misled broker about purpose of loans, despite fact that statute prohibited
broker's, but not investor's, conduct and despite fact investor deemed to be part of statutorily
protected class). The question of who is to police illegal extensions of credit now has been
resolved explicitly by a statute making it illegal to extend or receive illegal credit. The
significance of that statutory change is discussed in Stern v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, 603 F.2d 1073, 1080 (4th Cir. 1979). See also infra text accompanying notes 172-85.
These cases involving statutory violators show that courts still make independent decisions that
are dictated in part by their calculations about how to maximize efficient deterrence.

ILLEGAL CONTRACTS AND EFFICIENT DETERRENCE

129

portionate knowledge, expertise, or bargaining power, will accompany it. 5 9
Some courts articulate the status factor as a rationale for granting relief, 60
while others come to results that reveal it as an implicit concern.
Gates v. River Construction Co.61 illustrates the circumstances under
which a plaintiff with inferior status prevails against a defendant with
superior status, despite the fact that both are parties to an illegal contract.
The claimant in Gates was an employee who sued his employer for unpaid
wages. The purpose of the employment contract was to induce an alien to
enter the United States without the requisite governmental approval, in
violation of a federal statute. 5 2
The defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds of illegality. The trial
court granted the motion, citing the violation of public policy. On appeal,
the Supreme Court of Washington reversed and remanded, concluding
that the contract should be enforced. 63 Although the court did not explicitly
ground its conclusion on status, the court emphasized that the employer,
who knowingly participated in the scheme, should not be permitted to
profit at the employee's expense. 64 Gates is consistent with results in other
59. See, e.g., cases citeci infra note 65.
60. See infra text accompanying notes 108-19 (discussing Lockman v. Cobb).
61. 515 P.2d !020 (Alaska 1973).
62. The statute im•olved was 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1954) which provided: "[T]he
following classes of aliens shall be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded f1'0m
admission into the United States: ... (14) Aliens seeking to enter the United States, for the
purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined
and certified to the Secretary of State and to the Attorney General" as to the need for such
laborers and that the employment of the alien would not "adver5ely affect the wages and
working conditions" of similarly situated workers in the United States.
63. Gates, 515 P.2d at 1022.
64. Jd. The court was unwilling to permit such enrichment based in part on its
interpretation of the congressional intent reflected in the legislative history. Because the prior
statute regulating aliens had made such contracts for employment "utl~rly void," and not
merely unenforceable, while the current statute at issue in Gates omitted t.he voidness
provision, the court surmised that ''Congress determined that the e:x:dusion of certain aliens
from admission to the United States was a more satisfactory sanction than rendering their
contracts void and thus unjustifiably enriching employers of such alien laborers." ld. at I 023.
Thus, because of the emphasis on statutory interpretation, Gates might be perceived as weak
support for the operative effect of status. Yet the repeal itself arguably was ambiguous and the
court cited no legislative history to support its interpretation. Although Congress substituted
a seemingly less harsh provision without the voidness language, the newer statllle did not
soecificallv address the effect. if anv. such contracts were then to have and whether thev
inl<:nd ..d th< t<'pc d ~<• m~k<' <'mr.hl\Ointl CLiltract~ ot tlleg:~l allen~ enf<•H<·,,hlt- b, hnrh
t·mpl"'"r :111d ~rnpl<>lt'c:- :md tiJ.I, l)('nctir ht,rh pantc-~ Oesp11e tho~ pntt"ntial amht~ltlt\', rlw
court c ""''' t. '<>t. •t rul' rb. · ,t.olttT< tn 'll<'h l ,, " ' •h~r afforded untl:uer:~l rt'lit·f 10 rh<'l'lnplo\ C('
and ru;uk r ht tr.< .111111~ Ill rite rq.>c.tl :~pp<'.tr unamb1~unu~
111,. 'r.ttuh' under" f.1clr rill' r,ar, case :trrht .-til''' ,upnceckrl h1· tlw lmmi~r;ttion R.,form
and Conrn.l.\,r ol l~·xu. l'uh I. :\1.. ~·':l·ou:~. llv Star 3~titl mddi,•d <II x l. SC § U'21taJ
1Supp 1\. l~t'lri, II{( .. \ IRC.\ m:tkC'I 11 un.a"h.l !r.r ..a pcr~•m or ntiH'r c·ntl!,. t11 hirt', ot t.o

recruit or refer for a fee, for employment in the United States an ... alien knowing that the
alien is an unauthorized alien." 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(I)(A) (Supp. IV 1986). One district court
recently has interpreted that statute to deny an alien the right to sue for minimum wages
otherwise guaranteed workers under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). See Patel v. Sumani
Corp., 660 F. Supp. 1528, 1535 (N.D. Ala. 1987) (FLSA does not provide protection to illegal
aliens). The Patel district court decision was reversed on appeal by an II th Circuit Court of
Appeals sensitive to the economic incentive that denial of the FLSA claim would have on
employers to hire illegal aliens. 846 F.2d 698, 704 (1988). The district court might have
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cases in which courts treat employees favorably in illegal contract actions
against employers.H5
reached a different result if they had focused on efficient deterrence as a policy factor in its
analysis. See also In re Reyes, 814 F.2d 16R, 170 (5th Cir. 1987) (FLSA applies to citizens and
aliens, irrespeCtive of documented status).
65. Gates illustrates the general proposition that in illegal mntracts cases, employees are
likely to prevail on claims for unpaid wages, either in contract. under federal statute. or on
quantum meruil, against their employers. See, e.g., Patel v. Surnani Corp.• 846 F.2d 700 (lith
Cir. 1988) (emplo~·ee permitted to prevail on wage claim despite employment contract's
violation of I RCA); Trumbo v. Bank of Berkeley, 77 Cal. App. 2d 704, 713, 176 P.2d 376,38 I
(194 7) (employee entitled to reasonable ntlue of services even though contract of employment
illegally limited directors' hiring discretion): Ni1.amuddowlah v. Bengal Cabaret, Inc., 92 Misc.
2d 220, 223, 399 N.Y.S.2d 1'\54, 857 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (even though employee was coconspirator
in scheme to circumvem immigration laws he was entitled to payment since employer was
"main perpetrator" of scheme to circunwent im migration laws), n/Jd, 4 15 N.Y.S.2d 685, 686
(App. Oiv. 1979): Dezsofi ,·. j acub)', 178 Misc. 85 1,854,36 N.Y.S.2d 672.675 (Sup. Ct. 1942)
(granting alien recovery for services rendered pursuant to contract entered into after illegal
immigration, because statute rendered void only contracts e ntered into before immip;ration).
But see Wi5e ~·. Radis, 74 Cal. App. 765, 77?., 242 P. 90, 95 (1925) (denying unlicensed real
estate broker partial commission from licensed partner since broker's failure to comply with
licensing statute rendered promise to share unenforceable): REsT.n~mn (SF.co:-;n) OF CoNTMi.Ts
§ 181 (1979) (discussing effect of failure to comply with licensing statute; recovery denied
when purpose is regulatory and policy outweip;hs "interest in ... enforcement"). The different
result in the unlicensed broker cases is explainable in terms of deterrence. It may be that courts
and legislatures are reluctant to permit brokers to recover because it is cheaper to p\ll the cost
of nonenforcemem on the bmker; she is likely to be more knowledgeable about (l) whether
she is licen~ed and (2) the consequences of the statutory violation. But see infra note 152
(suggesting reasons to permit recovery for unlicensed professionals).
Courts also gi,·e employees preferential treatmem against employers in the context of
"illegal" restrictive c.ovenants. See RrsT.nnrrsT (SEcmm) Or CoSTRACTO ~ IRS comment g (1979)
("post-employment restraints ax·e scrutini7.ed with particular care because they are often the
product of unequal bargaining power"); see also E.A. f ,\RsswoRTH , C.\SIS A~ o M..-rERI.~L.~ 0-.:
Co~'TRACTs 446-48 ( 1988). Thus. courts are likely to construe strictly such co,·enants and deny
enforcement by the employer, permitting the employee to avoid the obligation. Sre, e.g., White
v. fle tcher/Mavo/Assocs .. 251 Ga. 20:3. 207-01-l. 303 S.E.2d 746. 750-51 (J9R31 (refusing to
rcdr:ofr non·· >rr.p('(iiL<•Il cr,n·nurt btr.oJ'< ,·in· ptt:'ld<'ltt '':1~ t·rrrpiO\<C worh<.111 h..J~;•uroro~
po'''·r• 1 co11trcl R~dmo.nrl' J<o,<~l F.•rci In<, t4·l t ... 711.712. :"I'' :WI SJ. to c,,.,:,. -,flf .
)lh H•·r, ti11d.ug ''"f· rop~·t lllll.ll<ltc•n ~g;•llt>l e1nplo,ee fc r "''l~tiun ,,t re'11" tt\C n \lll,1nt
prohibiting competition for 50 miles over 5 years and noting stringent treatment given to such
covenants in employment context); Howard Schultz & Assocs. of the Southeast, Inc. v.
Broniec, 2:~9 Ga. 181, 188, 236 S.E.2d 265, 270 (1977) (denying employer injunction to
enforce unreasonable covenant not to compete); Rita Personnel Servs. Int'l, Inc. v. Kot, 229
Ga. 314,317-18, 191 S.E.2d 79, 81 ( 1972) (refusing to enforce or sever unreasonable territorial
covenant restricting competition by employee); Kern Mfg. Corp. v. Sam, 182 Ga. App. 135,
138, 141-42, 355 S.E.2d 437, 442 , 444-45 (1987) (denying employer right to enforce and
refusing to "blue pencil" overly broad territorial restrictions in noncompetition covenam, but
permitting employee to recover damages under contract if proved on remand); H & R Block,
Inc. v. Lovelace, 208 Kan. 538, 544-46, 493 P.2d 205, 211-12 (1 972) (denying franchisor right
to enforce unreasonable restrictive covenant and citing inequality in status and bargaining
power between employee and employer); Smith, Batchelder & Rugg v. Foster, 119 N.H. 679,
685-86, 406 A.2d 1310, 1314 (1979) (denying employer right to enforce unreasonable
restrictive covenant or to obtain reformation of it, in part because employees who executed
covenant after e mployme nt given liu.le opportunity to understand cove nant); Peat, Marwick.
Mitchell & Co. v. Sharp, 585 S.W.2d 905, 910 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (allowing withdrawing
partner to recover profits under partnership agreement even though partnership's covenant
not to compete unreasonable, against public policy, thus \menforceable).
In contrast to the strict standards used when the restrictive covenant is between the
employee and the employer, courts apply a more lenient standard in judging restrictive
covenants in the context of what they regard as an anns-length sale of business. See, e.g., Wells
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The pattern of results in nonemployee cases also reflects the impact of
status upon courts' decisions. This is evident in a number of contexts. For
example, courts regularly grant relief to purchasers against sellers in cases
of securities law violations, 15fi borrowers against banks and other lenders in
\'.Wells, 400 N.E.2d 1317, 1320 (\1ass. 1980) (different, more lenient standarct applicable to
noncom petition covenam in buyer/seller context): Sfe also Blake, Employee AfP·ument:, Not to
Compete, 73 H AR\". L. Rn·. 625, 647-48 ( 1960). From this perspective, courts treat the issue of
potentially ''illegal'' covenants differently in different contexts depending on the relative status
of the parties. Courts often justify this differentiated treatment on the bat·gaining power
factor; they afford employee noncom petition cm•enants less deference since they are less likely
to be freely negotiated than such covenants made in the context of an arms-length transaction.
E. A. F.-\R:-:swORTH. supra note 3, § 5.3, at 33R. Thus, courts are more likely to blue pencil the sale
of business contracts.
Heightened scrutiny in the employee context could be rationalized in terms of distributive
and paternalistic motives. See Kennedy, supra note 2, at )717-22. Courts strike down
noncompetition clauses to pmtect employees and thereby equalize the balance of power
between employers and employees. It is possible. however, to rationalize the variegated
application of the noncompet.ition policy of enforcement in efficient deterrence terms.
Arguably, in the sale of business context, the noncom petition covenant is the subject of open
and knowledgeable bargaining. Sec Blake, supra, at 647-48 (by implication). For that reason,
and assuming the price is fair, the purchaser has no paniculat· reason to suspect a resource
misallocation. Tlllls, it would often be costly to deter resource misallocation in the sale of
business context. On the other hand. when the employee agrees to a noncompetition
covenant, the employer may have reason to suspect, based on the persuasive imped iments to
hard bargaining a nd the salary negotiated, that the employee has given up a dispro portion ate
amount in the noncom petition clause in return for the agreed-upon wage. She may be getting
nothing extra for the noncompetition clause beyond what she ordinarily would receive for
performing those services. Id. at 64 7. Thus, it may be more efficient to deter the employer who
suspects a resource misallocation than to deter the employee from entering such covenants.
66. See, e.g.. Frost & Co. v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp .. 312 U.S. 38,43 (1940) (permining
innocent purchaser to enforce stock option agreement against corporation even though
unregi~tered securities violated Securities Act of 1933; no-effect conclusion would thwart
investor prmection goal~): General Life of Mo. Inv. Co. \'. Shamburger, 546 F.2d 774, 777,
7R2, 784 (8th Cir. 1976) (denying corporate issuer, who violated securities laws by failing to
register public offering, right to enforce stock subscription involving rhc unregistered stock
against innocent purchaser not otherwise "hav[ing] access to the kind of information which
registration would disclose"); Smith v. Turner, 238 Cal. App. 2d 141, 145, ]49, 47 Cal. Rptr.
582, 585, 587 (1965) (granting plaintiff-purcha~ers recovery of payment~ made to more
experienced sellers in violation of statute prohibiting collection prior to incorporation;
"plaintiffs ... not men of financial or business experience," thus parties "not upon an equal
basis''); Kneeland v. Emerton, 280 M<l~~. ~71, 378, 183 N.E.. 155, 159 (l 932) (because plaintiff
purchaser within protected class, entitled to recover price or rescission}; Loewenstein v.
Midwest.crn Inv. Co., 181 Neb. 547, 554, 149 N.W.2d 512, 516 (1967) (permitting plaintifffarmer-buyer to recover against defendant corporation in illegal sale of treasury stock). In
some of these cases in which courts allow damages or reMitutionary recovery, the statute
specifically empowers the purchaser to rescind or recover damages. ln other cases, the statute
simply proscribes conduct of which the party raising the in pari delicto defense is guilty. In one
sense these securities cases considered together may not appear to stand for any proposition
other than the following: First, if the statute permits the purchaser to recover and the party
seeking recovery belongs to the class sought to be protected by the legislat.ion, the court has no
choice but to grant the recovery authorized by statute. Second. if the statute proscribes certain
conduct of which one party is guilty and the other innocent (such as the crime of selling
unregistered securities), it makes sense to permit the non vio lator (purchaser) to recover from
the violator (seller) because we do not want to penalize nonculpable behavior. However, even
in situations in which the statute permits recovery by purchasers, courts still may deny
recovery if t.hey are in pari delicto. See, e.g., Pinter v. Dahl, lOR S. Ct. 2063, 2072-75 (1988)
(recognizing that certain conduct by purchasers might bar rescission action); Malamphy v.
Reai-Tex Enter., Inc., 527 F.2d 97R, 980 (4th Cir. 1975); L. Loss, supra note 58, at 1196 n.94.
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cases of interest rate violations,67 dients against attorneys in cases of
unpermitted fee arrangements,68 and insured parties against insurance
companies in cases of illegal premiums or other illegal agreements. 69 In
Thus, in granting recovery to purchasers, the court is carving out protection for a class of
purchasers with certain characteristics who may recover despite their participation in the
illegality. The creation of the two subclasses of purchasers-those who may and those who may
not recover-reflects a judicial manipulation of recovery rules to effectuate efficient deterrence.
In the class of cases in which the party raising the in pari delicto defense is a violator of a
stauue, the court still must decide whether a nonviolator may recover in contract iflhe statute
is silent on that question. In deciding that question, the court makes independent judgments,
which can be explained in terms of efficient deterrence. See, e.g., Smith ~-. Turner, 238 Cal.
App. 2d 141, 152, 47 Cal. Rptr. 582, 589 (1965) ("'effective deterrence is best realized by
enfon:ing the [purchaser's] claim' "(quoting Lewis & Queen v. N .M. Ball Sons, 48 Cal. 2d 141,
151,308 ·P.2d 713, 719 (1957))). While it is conceivable that the court could decide that the best
way to protect investors would be to deny them all recovery and thus provide the incentive to
investigate the illegality and avoid such transactions in the fut.ure, the decision to grant
recovery to the purchaser demonstrates that courts prefer to impose the losses of illegal
contracts on those with superior status because they regard that result as consistent with
efficient deterrence. For a discussion of the circumstances warranting a denial of the rescission
right ordinarily available to purchasers, see Brief for SEC at 8-18, Dahl v. Pinter, 787 F.2d 985,
reh'g denied en bane (5th Cir. 1986), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 2063 (1988).
67. Browning v. Morris, 98 Eng. Rep. 1364 (1778); .<U also cases cited in Ryan v. Motor
Credit Co., 130 N.J. Eq. 531,545-46,23 A.2d 607,616-17 (Ch. 1941), affd, 132 N.J. Eq. 39R,
28 A.2d 181 ( 1942). Usury cases generally permit the borrower to recover the illegal interest
paid. Sometimes recovery of the principal and legal interest is allowed but the lender usually
is entitled to keep the legal interest and to repayment of the principal. 6A A. CoRRIN, supra note
4, at § 1507. One could argue that merely awarding the usury victim recovery of the illegal
interest may not be consistent with efficient deterrence. Since the lender will engage in
multiple illegal transactions and is knowledgeable about the illegality, he is the cheapest cost
a voider. If the most that he can ever be required to give up is the illegal interest in cases that
actually are brought, the lender may continue to charge illegal amounts, secure in the
expectation that he wHI forfeit only a small portion of the illegal interest paid on an ad hoc
basis. When that is considered in light of the total illegal interest recoverable over the multiple
transactions. deterrence may require the imposition of a larger penalty.
68. Wade. supra note 12, at 278 ("If the defendant is an attorney, for example, courts often
refuse to let him rely upon the maxim."); see, e.g., Berman v. Coakley, 243 Mass. 348, 355, 137
N.E. 667, 671 (1923) (denying in pari delicto defense to attorney who induced plaintiff to make
payment by threatening that without payment indictment would follow, and permitting
plaintiff-client to recover extorted funds); Kukla v. Perry, 361 Mich. 311, 321, 329-30, 105
N.W.2d 176, 181. 185 (1960) (requiring attorney, who extorted illegal mortgage covenant
under which plaintiff defaulted, to cancel notes and mortgages and to account for amounts
received); Feld & Sons, Inc. v. Pechner, Dorfman, Wolfee, Rounick & Cabot, 312 Pa. Super.
125, 142-43, 458 A.2d 545, 554-55 ( 1983) (clients who engaged in criminal conduct with
advice of their counsel to defeat. unionization drive permitted to recover legal fees paid to
counsel); Peyton v. Margiotti, 398 Pa. 86, 93, 156 A.2d 865, 869 (1959) (permitting client to
recover money given to attorney "despite the essential invalidity" of agreement under which
client agreed to pay lawyer a fee contingent on the lawyer's successfully obtaining release of
client's relative). But see Corti v. Fleisher, 93 Ill. App. 3d 517, 532,417 N.E.2d 764,775 (1981)
(denying attorney recovery or enforcement against ex-law firm, with which he entered into
unpermitted employment and fee arrangements to which client had not consented, because
this would deprive clients of right to choose counsel). The emphasis on the attorney's status in
the denial of recovery has sometimes been explained in terms of the need to maintain the
reputation of the profession, see Wade, supra note 12, at 278, and in terms of a fiduciary
relationship.
69. See, e.g., Homestead Supplies, Inc. v. Executive Life Ins. Co., 81 Cal. App. 3d 978,991,
993, 14 7 Cal. Rptr. 22, 29 (1978) (granting insured declaratory judgment on recovery of
annual premium and rejecting insurer's defense that because premium was illegal and
represented rebate premium and rate discrimination in direct contravention of statute, the
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short, if the parties have disparate status, the courts should grant relief to
the party with inferior status and deny relief to the party with superior
status.
The impact of status is reflected in the Supreme Court's recent
decision of Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner. 70 In Bateman Eichler
the Court confronted an issue on which lower federal courts had split:
"[W]hether the common law in pari delicto defense bars a private damages
action under the federal securities laws against corporate insiders and
agreement should be unenforceable); Denver Fire Ins. Co. v. McClelland, 9 Colo. 11, 26, 9 P.
771. 779-80 (1885) (allowing policy holder to enforce insurance contract even though ultra
vires for the insurance company to is~ue it); Williams v. Continental Life & Accident Co., 100
Idaho 71, 74, 593 P.2d 708, 711 (1979) (granting insured recovery on policies against insurer
despite fact that policies violate statutory dollar limitation; insured allowed tO "reasonably and
justifiably rely upon the superior knowledge and expertise of the insurer for full compliance
with the law"); Bowman v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 348 Mich. 53!, 547,83 N.W.2d 434,
437 (1957) (plaintiff allowed tO recover against insurance company on policy despite fact
plaintiff caused accident while illegally moving parked car); Kellogg v. German Am. Ins. Co.,
133 Mo. App. 391,403, 113 S.W. 663,667 (1908) (granting insured recovery on fire insurance
despite insured's participation in selling liquor on insured premises); Buck v. Mountain States
lnv. Corp., 76 N.M. 261, 266, 414 P.2d 491, 495 (1966) (reforming insurance policy to
conform to insured's oral understanding despite contention that policy illegal); Douglass v.
Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 42 N.M. 190,213,76 P.2d 453,467 (1938) (granting
insured recovery on policy against insurer even though policy issued in violation of statute);
Messersmith v. American Fidelity Co., 232 N.Y. 161, 166, 133 N.E. 432,433 (1921) (granting
insured recovery on insurance policies even though insured gave pe•·mission to minor to drive
in violation of statute).
The cases described above involve two categories of cases. In some cases the insurers violated
statutory provisions that prohibited the payment of rebates, required the form of the
insurance contract to conform to certain requirements, required the agent issuing the policy
to be licensed, or limited the issuance of contracts to those within the insurer's corporate
powers. In other cases the insured, rather than the insurer, had violated a statute that was
unrelated to the contract of insurance.
In the first category, there is often no legislative determination as to what effect, if any,
should be given to contracts issued in violation of the statute. In deciding that the violator
should be estopped from raising the illegality defense, the courts emphasize the "premium for
dishonest dealing" which might result should the court bar recovery to the innocent party.
Denver Fire Ins. Co., 9 Colo. at 20,9 P. at 775. In emphasizing the inducement to the defendant
to violate the statute that might result should he be permitted to use his own wrongdoing as
a defense, the courts ignore another potential inducement to violations by insureds. lf
insureds are, for example, permitted to recover rebates, though they otherwise are prohibited
by statute, perhaps they will be induced to seek out insurers who are illegally offering them,
resulting in a greater number of illegal rebates. Denying insureds recovery of the illegal
rebates could provide a deterrence to their entering into prohibited rebate agreements. The
courts' failure to analyze these consequences from this alternative rule of enforceability reflects
a determination that the costs of deterring insureds, including the additional costs of educating
insureds to the illegalities, outweigh the incremental deterrence that will be achieved.
In the second category of cases, enforcement of the insurance contract by a law violator
arguably will induce more wanton violations of the law. The theory is that law violators who
know that their ordinary contracts will not be affected will be induced to commit more crimes
than if courts treat law violators as pariahs, entitled to no judicial aid of any kind. The
disinclination to adopt this approach may reflect an underlying concern with efficient
deterrence. lt would be costly to deter violations such as the moving of the parked car,
Bowman, 348 Mich. 531, 83 N. W .2d 434, on the basis of the no-effect rule because it would be
difficult to persuade people to weigh those costs regarding contract enforcement at the time
of the violation. The contract rules simply would seem too remote to be properly internalized.
See also infra text accompanying notes 186-93.
70. 472 u.s. 299 (1985).

134

74

IOWA LAW REVIEW

115

[1988]

broker-dealers who fraudulently induce investors to purchase securities by
misrepresenting that they are conveying material nonpublic information
about the issuer."'l
In cases such as Bateman Eichler, both the tipper, who furnishes the
false information, and the tippee, who trades on the information, are guilty
of securities law violations. 72 When a tippee sues a broker-dealer on I Ob-5
grounds, the tipper usually asserts an in pari delicto defense, arguing that
the tippee's guilt bars recovery. The availability of that defense has varied
among jurisdictions. 7 3 In Bateman Eichler the Court generally held the in
pari delicto defense to be unavailable in suits by tippees against tippers.
In rejecting the availability of the defense, the Bateman Eichler Court
stressed the goal of efficient deterrence and concluded that because of
disparities in access to counsel, susceptibility to sanctions, and the parties'
positions in the chain of violations, imposition of costs on the tipper class
was likely to be the best way to reach that goal.''~ Thus, the Court
"demonstrated greater concern for the maximum deterrence of insider
trading than for punishing each and every culpable actor."7 :;
The disparate treatment that courts afford claimants based on their
status is consistent with an efficient deterrence theory. Both Bateman Eichler
and Gates demonstrate the impact of the status factor on the outcome of a
claim made under an illegal contract. When the plaintiff and defendant
have a marked disparity in status, the disadvantaged plaintiff should
prevail, despite his participation in an illegal contract. When there is a
parity in status, as when the parties are co-adventurers, a plaintiff should
lose upon a defense of contract illegality. If one accepts that differential
knowledge of the applicable rules of law accompany status disparities, 76
then it is more economically efficient to place the risk of loss on the party
with superior status. Thus, the party who is likely to be more aware of the
consequences of illegality than her contract partner, and therefore more
71. /d. at 301. Compare Moholt , .. Dean Witter Reynolds, [nc., 478 F. Supp. 451 , 453
(D.D.C. 1979) (denying summary judgment on tippers' in pari delicto defense to tip pees' claim
of fraudulent misrepresentation in stock purchases, n oting "greater threat ... to the integrity
of the r·egulatory framework" posed by brokers) and Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc..
325 F. Supp. 50,57 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (tippers not permitted to rely on in pari delicto defense to
defeat tippees' daim because "broker-dealer presents a greater potential threat to undermining the statutory protection intended for the public investor") r11ith Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Nat'l
Bank. 555 F.2d 1152, 1164 (3d Cir. 1977) (in pari delicto precludes tippee's recovery from
tipper), ccrl. denied, 434 U.S. 965 (1977) and Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp.• 412 F.2d 700, 705 (5th
Cir. 1969) (deteiTence benefit from allowing tippees to sue tippers overshadowed by
"enforceable wananty" created if in j)!lTi delicto defense rejected).
72. Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 311·12.
73. See Note, In Pari Delicto, Under the Fcdrral Securities Laws, Bateman Eichler, Hill
Richards, Inc. v . Berner, 72 CoR);£LL L REv. 345, 347 (1987).
74. Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 313-18.
75. Note, .Htpra note 73, at 355-56. For a discussion of the issue of tippee recovery and the
in pari delicto defense, see generally Ruder, Multiple D~fendanls in Securities Law Fraud Cases:
Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L.
REv. 597 (1972); Note, supra note 73; Comment, Plainti[{s Conduct as a Bar to Recovery Under the
Securities Acts: In Pari Delicto, 48 T£x. L. Rt:v, 181 ( 1969); Note, Rule IOb-5-Application of the In
Pari Delicto Defense in Suits Brought Against Secu-rities Brokers by CtJStomers Who Have Traded on
l11side lnj0t71Ultion, 37 V.;,so. L. R Ev. 557 (1984).
76. See Kostritsky, supm note 1. at 918.
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likely to consider those consequences when formulating her behavior, will
be denied judicial aid. Moreover, even if the parties share equal knowledge
of the illegality (as in Gates77 ) it still may be more efficient to put the loss on
the employer rather than employee. The law will reach the "source" of the
wrongdoing and thus nip the illegality at the outset. 78 By fashioning a rule
under which the professional wrongdoer always loses, courts might drive
many of them out of business. 79 If fewer wrongdoers remain professionals,
there will be fewer participants in the wrongdoing. Moreover, assuming
that professional wrongdoers will engage in multiple wrong acts, loss
shifting to the professional will conserve judicial resources. Focusing
deterrence on this party obviates the need for applying judicial resources to
the myriad victims of professional wrongdoing. On the other hand, if the
parties appear to be on an equal footing, especially if they are coconspirators, they are equally deterrable and so the court should leave the parties
where they are. 80

B.

The Relative Knowledge of the Illegality and/or of Facts Giving Ri~e
to the Illegality~ll
1.

Party Ignorant of Facts Giving Rise to Illegality

A party's relative degree of knowledge of the underlying illegality also
should affect her ability to recover. If the party seeking relief is "excusably
ignorant" of the facts giving rise to the illegality or is unaware of the illegal
nature of the transaction itself, then the court should grant relief-in
whatever form it is sought-to that party.8 2 For instance, courts have
77. See supra text accompanving notes 61-65.
78. Bateman Eichler, 472 LS. at 316.
79. See infra note II R.
80. See, e.g., Danebo Lumber Co. v. Koutsky-BrennatJ-Vana Co., !82 F.2d 489, 490, 500
(9th Cir. 1950) (coconspirators to violate Emergency Price Control Act), cert. denied , 340 U.S.
830 (1950); Tarbert Trading, Ltd. v. Cometals, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 561, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(conspiracy to furnish false EEC certificate); Rttssell ,._ Soldinger, 59 Cal. App. 3d 633, 638,
64.1-42, 131 Cal. Rptr. 145, 147, 149-50 (1976) (conspiracy by "'experienced real estate
operators'" to stifle bidding); Woodward v. jacobs. 541 P.2d 69 I, 692 (Colo. Ct. App. I 975)
(conspinKy to violate zoning laws); Braverman v. City ofTavlonille, 64 Ill. App. 3d 522, 527,
381 ~.E.2d 373, 376 (1978) (conspiracy to violate environmental protection laws); Cook v.
Wolverine Stockyards Co., 344 Mich. 207, 209-10, 73 N.W.2d 902,904 (1955) (conspiracy of
buyer and seller to evade taxes which would apply to them as transporters of cattle); Ryan v.
Motor Credit Co .. 130 :\.]. Eq. 531, 533-34, 563, 23 A.2d 607, 611, 625 ( 1941). a[fd. 1~2 N.J.
Eg. ~98, 28 A.2d 181 (1942) (car dealer anrllender under Small Loan Act conspired to violate
loan act by creating a series of dummy loans); Jenkins v. Fowler, 24 Pa. ~08, ~I 0 (I R55)
(denying relief for removal of fence when parries agreed in advance to put up fence which
blocked public road illegally); Sinnat· v. LeRoy, 44 Wash. 2d 728, 731, 270 P.2d ROO, 802
(1954) (conspiracy to procure liquor license illegally); Schara v. Thiede, 58 Wis. 2d 489, 494,
496,206 N.W.2d 129, 1~1-32. 1~3 (1973) (conspiraq- to violate liquor licensing stamtes).
81. See Wade, suj1ra note 12, at 265-66 (drawing the distinction between ignorance of fact
and ignorance of law); sn also 6A A. CoRm?>". supra note 4, at §§ 1538-1539.
82. 6A A. CoRnt?>", supra note 4, at~ 1538. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides for
conlractual and restittttionary remedies to such "excusably ignorant parties." Section 180
provides that ""[i]f a promisee is excusably ignorant of facts or of legislation o f a minor
character. of which the promisor is not excusably ignorant and in the absence of which the
promise would be enforceable, the promisee has a claim for damages for its breach."
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RtSTATr.M~ST (SEco:o;o) or Co~TR.~CTS § 180 (1979). Similarly,§ 198 provides: "A party has a claim
in restitution for performance that he has rendered under or in return for a promise that is
unenforceable on grounds of public policy if (a) he was excusably ignorant of the facts or of
legislation of a minor character ... or (b) he was not equally in the wrong ... .'' Rr.sTATEMENT
(Sf.cOso) or Co:uRAcrs § l 98 (I 979); see also Hedla v. McCool. 476 F.2d I 223, 1227-28 (9th Cir.
1983) (granting damages when accountant ignorant of illegality of architect's unlicensed
status); Homestead Supplies, Inc. v. Executive Life lns. Co., 81 Cal. App. 3d 978, 991. 14 i Cal.
Rptr. 22, 29 (1978) (allowing recovery when evidence showed that plaintiff ignorant of
illegality in annual premium); Nevcal Enters. v. Cal-Neva Lodge, Inc.. 217 Cal. App. 2d 799,
806-07, 32 Cal. Rptr. 106, I 10 (1963) (when defendant seller misrepresents legality of
transaction, plaintiff buyer can recover despite illegality); Marshall v. LaBoi, 125 Cal. App. 2d
253, 267. 273, 270 P.2d 99, 108, 112 (1954) (granting recovery to architect and contractor,
who were ignorant of client's illegal procurement of construction permit); Oakes v. Guarantee
Ins. Co., 573 S.W.2d 899, 903 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978) (insurance agent's failure to procure
requisite certification rendered contract between agent and insurer illegal but did not bar
insurer from recovering since insurer ignoram of facts causing illegality); E.A. FAII.N~WOllTH,
supra nore 3, § S.i, at 358; Strong, supra note 4, at 370.
T he importance of relative knowledge and sophistication of the parties in another context
can be seen in the early cases concerned with violations of the federal securities laws' margin
requirements. 15 C.S.C. § 78g (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). As originally enacted, the law
prohibited bankers and brokers from extending credit for the purchase of securities except in
accordance with regulations prescribed by the Federal Reserve Board. /d. Regulations T (for
brokers and dealers) and Q (for banks) "prescribe minimum margin requirements referred to
as maximum loan values which have been varied from time to time." Serzvsko v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The issue that arise's under these
regulations is whether an investor has an implied private cause of action when the broker or
bank lends in excess of the margin requirement and if so, under what circumstances the
investor can be considered as in pm'i ddicto with the broker. In Se!"Z_Ysko the plaintiff investor
sued 10 recover for losses sustained when the bank extended credit in violation of the margin
requirements and then sold the coUateral at a loss to satisfy margin calls. The plaintiffs theory
of loss was that if the bank had required the loans to be collateralized properly, in accordance
with the statute, the plaintiff would own the collateral, which had been sold at a loss but which
had appreciated in value by the time of the trial. After holding that the investor had an implied
cause of action, the court nevertheless rejected the plaintiffs claim, citing the plaintiffs
knowledge. sophistication, and fraudulent misleading of the banker as to the purpose of the
loans that resulted in the statutory violations. The court found that "ro allow the plaintiff to
recover in this action would be to encourage rather than discourage deception on the part of
investor-bonowers with resulting prejudice to the observance nf the margin requirements of
the Act." ld. at 89-~10. Although the Serzysko court did not discuss the results of the case in
efficiency terms, because the plaintiff knew nf the illegality of the loans and imentionally
misrepresented the purpose to induce the defendant to loan money, there is reason to think
that permitting him to recover would encourage further ,·iolations. In addition, there is no
particular reason to think that the defendant broker is a cheaper cost avoider or more
deterrable as a source of the wrongdoing. See Moscarelli v. Stamm, 2RR F. Supp. 453, 459
(E.D.N.Y. 1968) (court unwilling to concede that Congress intended to protect all investors
regardless of their participation in the margin violation). These cases generally emphasized
that "recovet)' should be denied to the sophisticated trader on the ground that he is an
accomplice in t he violation" and because "denying him a remedy would serve as a greater
deLCr rcm to futu re Yiolations." Commem, Securities Exclumge Act of 1934- Civil Remedies Based
Upon Tllegal Extenswn of Credit in Violatzon of Regulatzon T, 6 I MICH. L. R.n·. 940, 954 ( 1963). But
su Pearlstein v. Sc~tdder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1141-42 (2d Cir. 19i0) (even knowledgeable investors could pre\'ail against brokers under Reg. T, citing the fact that statutory
prohibition was directed solely at broker.~). Even Pearlstein, however, can be rationalized in
terms of efficient deterrence. In explaining its conclu~ion that even knowledgeable investors
could recover, the court said: "In our view the danger of permitting a windfall to an
unscrupulous investor is outweighed by the salutary policing effect which the threat of private
suits for compensatory damages can have upon brokers and dealers ... ."Pearlstein, 429 F.2d
at 1141.
Since Pearlstein, IS U.S.C. § i8g has been amended, making it illegal not only for brokers
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awarded relief based on justifiable ignorance of the facts in cases involving
the breach of a promise to marry made by a person who is already married.
In these cases, a promisee, ignorant of the fact that the promisor is already
married, may recover damages even if the promisor's married status
renders the contract illegal.83
Disparity in knowledge of the transaction's illegality explicitly influenced a decision to grant rescission to the party lacking knowledge in
National Bank v. Petrie.84 In Petrie, the plaintiff had purchased bonds from
a national bank. When the plaintiff attempted to set aside the transaction
on the grounds of fraudulent misrepresentation and recover the money
from the bank on a rescission theory,8 5 the bank defended on the ground
that the contract was illegal and "void" because the bank lacked the
authority to sell the bonds.86
The United States Supreme Court rejected the defense, explaining:
The complaint, to be sure alleges that the bank was acting
unlawfully in selling the bond, but it does not appear that Petrie
[the plaintiff] knew the fact, and it would be a strong thing to
charge him with notice or a duty to make inquiries as to how the
bank was conducting its business .... 87
Granting relief in such cases is consistent with a theory of efficient
deterrenc·e. In this context, the court seems to be saying that although it
could make the plaintiff a parallel enforcer of the bank's corporate
behavior, doing so would be a "strong" thing to do. "Strong" may mean
and hanh to lend tf no! m accorcl w1rh the margm tt>quin·nwtH , , but .• ~-., Iur :u~!.llll<'r< 1,
.Ktep! \Uch Juans. Ser IS l' SC ~ 7Rg(f) 1iqR:!1 ~ ,,of<o '\rern' \k~rilll.\IKh.J'i, 1<<'. I'C"r.IL<l
..\: ">r111tlL n03 F 2d 1073, !ORO (4th Cu·. JC:.':'~JJ ~··m,nlor t·q.•ally n:,puusi!JI,· "''h rlw hro!...t·r f,.r
observance of the margin requirements") ; Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 527 F.2d 1141,
1145 n.3 (2d Cir. 1975) (discussing e ffect of the addition of§ 78g(f) in extending responsibility
for policing violations to investors ).
The generally greater willingness to grant recovery to the party ignorant of the illegality also
can help explain, in efficiency terms, the r esults of cases permitting recovery against attorneys.
If one assumes that the attorney is likely to have greater knowledge of the illegality and that
this knowledge is a central feature of the average attorney-client relationship, then one also
can assume that on average it will be more efficient to deter the attorney from engaging in the
prohibited conduct. Although it would be possible to deter the client as well, it would be
necessary for the diem to undertake search costs regarding the illegality.
In addition to the knowledge disparity, another characteristic of the attorney-client
relationship may be a reposit of trust by the client in the attorney. The client may naturally
assume that the attorney will undertake responsibility for all the requisite legal formalities.
This trust also may constitute a persuasive barrier to explicit allocation of the risk of
nonenforcement. Kostritsky, supra note 1, at 937-38 (exploring impact of trust on hard
bargaining); see also infra text accompanying note 196. If such trust is a central feature of the
artorney-client relation, then it may be more efficient to make the attorney the primary
monitor of compliance. If the law sanctions the client, it will be expensive to break down that
trust in a way that makes the client realize that he must monitor the attorney's activities.
Moreover, the information gathering necessar y to give the client the knowledge to judge the
legality of the fee or other arrangement will require additional costs.
83. See Ashley v. Dalton, 119 Miss. 672, 699, 81 So. 4RR , 488-89 (1919) (cited in E.A.
FARXSWOHH, supra note 3, § 5.7, at 358).
84. 189 U.S. 423 (1903).
85. Jd.
86. ld. at 424; see also 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 378 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
87. Petrie, 189 C.S. at 424.
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harsh in terms of the costs involved in making the plaintiff such an
enforcer. From a strictly theoretical standpoint, denying relief to ignorant
parties will induce them and others to employ costly searches to determine
the legality of future transactions before entering them.8 8 The promisee of
the promise to marry will investigate the promisor's true status, the bond
purchaser will explore the bank's corporate powers, and both will adjust
their behavior accordingly. Yet even if the system did operate in this
perfect, theoretical manner, information gathering would be expensive for
society. Thus, it is costly to deter illegal contract formation by placing the
loss on unknowing parties. 89 Because in each case one party already knows
about the illegality of the agreement or of the facts causing it, the court can
deter that party and obviate expensive searches. The court, therefore, can
further efficient deterrence by regularly denying the knowledgeable party
relief and by granting recovery to the less knowledgeable party-the person
in the best position to avoid the illegality can do so at the least cost.

2.

Plaintiff Has Parity of Knowledge of the Illegality with Defendant

When the patties' knowledge of the underlying illegality appear~
equal, the courts should reject or restrict both parties' claims for judicial
relief. 90 This should be the case in both enforcement and rescission actions.
For example, in Woodward v. Jacobs 91 the court, in denying relief to both
claimants, relied on the fact that both parties were aware of the illegality. In
Woodward, a contractor agreed to build a unit for the owner for $40,000.
T he contractor, however, walked off the j ob after the $40,000 had been
paid, despite the fact that the job was not complete. The owner then hired
a substitute contractor to complete the job. The contractor sued for unpaid
bills and the owner counterclaimed for damagesY2
In denying recovery on both the claim and counterclaim, the court
approved the trial court's conclusion that "the contract was illegal and that
88. See supra note 9.
89. Professor Kron man is similarly concerned with the differential ability of parties to
avoid a cost, such as the cost of a mistake. o r, in this context, the cost of nonenforcement. In
analyzing why the law chooses to allon ue the risk of mistake to the party who is already aware
of it, he explores the greater costs engendered by putting the risk of a mi~take on a pany who
must, in order to avoid a mistake. "acqu ir[e] the necessary expertise himself." Kronman , su(Jra
no te 8, at 6.
90. See, e.g.• Danebo Lumber Co. v. Koutsky-Brennan-Vana Co., 182 F.2d 489, 490. 495
(9th Cir. 1950) (denying party rescission since he had been told abo ut the scheme to cover up
the conspiracy), cen. denied , :~40 C.S. 830 (1950); Wood ward v. Jacobs. 541 P.2d 691 , 692
(Colo. Ct. App. 1975) (denying both parties relief when "[r]here is evidence in the record that
the parties were aware that ... a triplex would be illegal"): Hendrix v. McKee, 2 8 1 Or . 123,
135, 575 P.2d 134, 141 (1978) (de nying recovery on employment contract whe n plaintiff
"knew that the defen dant was conducting a n illegal gambling operation"): T ucker v.
Binenstock, 3 10 Pa. 254,262, 165 A. 247, 249-50 (1933) (ctenying accounting when partner·s
"direct knowled ge .. of illegal litjuOr sales was clear); Schara v. Thiede, 58 \>Vis. 2d 489,494, 206
N.W.2d 129, 13 1·32 (1 9n) ("While they denied that they knew that the arrangement was
illegal. all parties to the contract recognized that the agreement was a su bterfuge to cover the
fact that both . .. were operating the tavern without a pro pe r license.'·).
9 1. 54 1 P.2d 69 1 (Colo. 1975).
92 . !d. at 692.
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it had been entered into by the parties with knowledge of its illegality." 9 3
The appellate court found "ample support in the record for the court's
finding that both parties were knowing, active participants in a plan of
action which violated public policy."94
McCauley v. Michael95 is another case in which the parties' knowledge
of the illegality affected the relief granted. In McCauley the plaintiff
tendered $500 to the defendant's agent to purchase 1,000 shares of
corporate stock. Minnesota blue sky regulations required that promotional
shares of the type sold to the defendant be escrowed and prohibited the sale
of these securities without the Blue Sky Commissioner's consentY 15 The
contract to sell shares to the plaintiff out of escrow and without the
Commissioner's consent violated these rules and was therefore illegal.
When the defendant refused to deliver the shares, plaintiff brought
suit seeking conversion damages or specific performance in the form of
delivery of the stock. A primary question on appeal was whether the
purchaser could enforce the stock purchase contract even though the
contract was illegaJ.9 7 The trial court found the agreement to be illegal and
unenforceable but permitted the purchaser to recover the $500. The
appellate court affirmed that conclusion, denying enforcement but permitting rescission. In concluding that enforcement was not available,98 the
court focused on the plaintiffs status as a broker- dealer, on his general
sophistication, and on his specific knowledge of the purchase contract's
illegality. "[H]e fully understood that escrowed shares cannot be transferred by any means." 99 The court concluded that "McCauley's knowledge
and experience generally as a licensed broker-dealer, and his specific
knowledge of this particular transaction, will not allow him to enforce the
stock contract ...." 1oo
Denying enforcement to claimants knowledgeable about the underlying illegality is consistent with the promotion of efficient deterrence. If one
assumes that both parties are knowledgeable about the illegality and there
are no constraints operative against either party, 101 then it further can be
assumed that the parties will be able to take account of the no-effect rule in
deciding whether to enter similar transactions in the future. The fact that
both parties will have an equal chance of being the plaintiff who faces. the
nonenforcement rule further enhances this deterrent effect since either
party may breach the agreement and either party may be the victim of the
breach. 10 2 Thus, the enforcement rule will maximize deterrence as both
93. /d.
94. Id.
95. 256 N.W.2d 491 (Minn. 1977).
96. Id. at 494.
97. ld. at 495 (although trial court originally found that plaintiff was unaware of illegality,
it subsequently amended its finding to conclude that plaintiff had knowledge).
98. !d. at 496. Under a strict application of the efficient deterrence doctrine, the court
should have denied plaintiff all relief. including rescission.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 496-97.
101. Su infra notes 128-32.
102. Thus, the ''system" of illegal contract deterrence is based on the randomness of loss
t>ccurences. Presumably, the costs associated with random losses arc lhought to be high
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parties will be likely to consider the chance that they, as victims of breach,
may not be permitted to recover, and both will adjust their behavior
accordingly.
With knowledgeable parties, the nonenforcement rule is not only a
strong deterrent, but is also the most efficient deterrent. Social costs are
incurred when courts award relief and shift losses from one party to
another. 103 When the parties are equally deterrable, shifting the loss from
one party to another will not increase the overall deterrent effect. Thus, it
would be inefficient for courts to generate the social expense of loss shifting
by enforcing the contract.
If loss shifting is generally not efficient when the parties are equally
knowledgeable about the illegality, then one must ask how, if at all, the
McCaule)• court's grant of restitutionary recovery to the purchaser promotes
efficient deterrence. Arguably, it would promote deterrence even more to
deny the plaintiff the $500 downpayment because otherwise the purchaser's entry into the illegal transaction becomes risk free. If one focuses on
the role that the parties played in the transaction, however, it may make
economic sense to grant restitutionary recovery. In McCauley, had the court
denied the plaintiff purchaser recovery of the $500, then the putative seller
would have been able to keep the $500 without delivering any of the shares
that were the subject of the illegal agreement. Denying restitution would
affirmatively tempt sellers in similar positions to commit violations, effectively involving many potential future purchasers. The purchaser that is
permitted to recover the $500 has less positive incentive to commit
violations than the seller who receives a windfall benefit.I04

C.

The ''Voluntariness'' of the Illegal Actions 10"

A third factor that should affect the outcome of cases is the voluntariness of the parties' actions. If circumstances indicate the presence of
fraud, duress, or other overreaching by one party, the courts should grant
judicial relief to the party who has been victimized by this conduct despite
his participation in an illegal contract. 106 On the other hand, if the facts
indicate that no constraints operate against either party and the claimant is
a voluntary and active participant in the illegality, the courts should not
grant a judicial remedy to either party. 107
enough to act as a powerful deterrent. This deterrence system operates on different
assumptions as to how legal rules should be applied than those underlying a system based on
formalities. See supra note 2. In the case of formalities, it is important to design a system with
predictability lhat parties can follow, secure in the expectation that if they follow its directives,
enforcement will be available.
I 03. Sl'e Coase, Sll{Jra note 35, at 15.
104. See infra text accompanying notes 145-56; see also infra note I 18.
105. See Kennedy, su.pra note 8. at 582; see generally Wade, su.pra note 12, at 272-82.
106. Wade, .mpra note 12, at 272; see aL<o National Bank & Loan Co. v. Petrie, 189 u.S. 423,
425 (1903); Youngblood v. Bailey, 459 So. 2d 855, 860 (Ala. 1984); Brand v. Elledge, 89 Ariz.
200,206,360 P.2d 213,218 (1961); Duval v. Wellman, 124 N.Y. 156, 162-63,26 N.E. 343,344
(1891): E.A. FAR,.~WORTH, supra note 3, § 5.9, at 365.
107. See infra text accompan ying notes 128-32.
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Defect in Bargaining Process: Fraud, Duress, or Other 011erreaching

Traditionally, courts grant relief more readily when defects in the
bargaining process render the "voluntariness" of the illegal agreement
suspect. 10 ~ Lochman rt. Cobb 109 illustrates the type of overreaching that will
prompt a court to permit the victim to recover. In Lockman, the plaintiff
(Cobb) sued to recover money paid to the defendants as a wager on an
illegal foot race. The facts indicated that the plaintiff, who knew nothing
about racing or betting, was fraudulently induced to enter a wager
agreement by the defendants, who were professional gamblers. The
defendants conspired and set up an elaborate scheme in which they told
Cobb that he was needed to bet their monev for them at a club for
millionaires and that "he was not to hazard any' money of his own." 110 As
part of the scheme, the runner on whom Cobb bet fell during the race and
a new race was scheduled. In this subsequent race, Cobb was persuaded to
bet his own money, assured by the defendants that the race was fixed in his
favor and that he would get back all of his money. Cobb was told that the
race took place, even though it had not, and that he had lost.
At trial, the court ordered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and
awarded damages for the amount requested. The Supreme Court of
Arkansas affirmed, emphasizing that the plaintiff was robbed of his money
by fraud and deceit:
[I]t was a conspiracy by the defendants to defraud the plaintiff
and to steal his money; to obtain by deceit and falsehood the
money of plaintiff by inducing him to believe that a foot race was
to be run and that they were actually wagering their money. one
against the other, upon it; and to induce him to believe he was
betting upon a foot race.I 1 I
A court's willingness to set aside such contracts or to grant avoidance
rights to a party that has been the victim of fraud or other overreaching can
be rationalized in many ways. 112 Legal theorists explain the law permitting
avoidance for fraud and duress victims in terms of (1) the assent
principle, 11 3 (2) welfare maximization, 114 and (3) substantive fairness
108. For authority disputing the unreality of the consent in coercive settings, see Dalzell.
Dums B_Y Ec1Y11Qmic Pressure, 20 N.C.L. REv. 237, 238 (1942)~ see alw infm note 127.
109. i7 A1·k. 279. 91 S. W. 546 (1905), discussed in 6A A. CoRBr:-<, supra note 4, at§ 1536 n.25.
110. 77 Ark. at 282, 91 S.\\'. at 547.
Ill. Td. at 288·89. 91 S.W. at 550.
112. Some courts have indicated that the presence of fraud by the defendant means that the
parties are not itl pari d~licto. "'[T]he equality of guilt may be upset by adding more to the
defendant's side of the balance as well as by taking away from the plaintiff's side." W11de, supra
note 12, at 2i6; see Youngblood v. Bailey, 459 So. 2d 855, 860 (Ala. 1984). The Re~ta.tcmenf
(Sew11d) of Contracts takes a similar position:
A claimant who can enforce the promise can, in the alternative, have restitution on
the ground that he is not equally in the wrong __ .. In the second type of case, the
claimant is regarded as being less in the wrong because he has been the victim of
misrepresentation .. _ pr-acticed on him by the other pany.
Rr_,T.nDrD.-T (SEco,.o) or Co,.TR.KT> § 198 comment b (1979).
113. "'[A]s compared with the consent to a valid contract. the consent secured by duress is
in some way less genuine, more superficial, in that the latter is r.he product of constraint, not
of a free will, being given merelv to avoid a more serious evil." Dalzell, supra note !OR, at 239.
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principles. 115 If a dominant party employs duress to overcome a person's
will, assent theorists find no reason to enforce the obligation because it lacks
the key element of voluntariness requisite to contract obligation. Some
contemporary scholars justify avoidance rights on the basis that contracts
induced by fraud do not maximize welfare. The victims of fraud lack the
information necessary to decide which transactions are value maximizing
and thus cannot allocate their resources to their highest valued uses.l 16
Critical legal studies scholars explain avoidance premised on duress as
evidence of paternalistic fairness principles that traditional scholars seek to
rleny and suppress. 11 '
The basis for an approach permitting fraud or duress victims to escape
the normal operation of the no-effect rule by granting relief can, however,
be reconceprualized in efficient deterrence terms. If one of the two parties
to a contract is peculiarly vulnerable to being duped by others, as in
Lockman, then it is not likely that the additional sanction of refusing judicial
aid would deter that person from entering such a contract in the future.
There are several reasons why this is so. First, if the fraudulent party
misleads the party seeking relief as to the steps being taken to comply with
the law, the misled party is not likely to take any further steps toward
compliance and it would be inefficient to sanction him. Second, even if a
party knows of the illegality and is defrauded on some other matter such as
the sureness of the potential profits, as in Lockman, a court still may decide
that it is more efficient to deter the defrauder than the victim of the fraud.
Parties who have been victims of fraud schemes may, as a general matter,
share certain vulnerabilities that make them susceptible to the persuasive
powers of others. Victims with these less sophisticated characteristics might
consistently overvalue the potential benefits of the deal and discount the
risks of nonenforceability, and thus fail to respond to the deterrent effect of
potential voidness. Alternatively, persons having these vulnerabilities may
have such substantial self-interested motivations to ignore the law that a
judicial sanction may be ineffective against them. If the courts nonetheless
deny relief to the fraud victim, it is not likely that the denial will result in
efficient deterrence. The constrained party would continue to enter into
illegal contracts because of his unsophisticated characteristics. When a
defect in the bargaining process exists, therefore, the cheapest and most
effective way to deter illegal contract formation is to impose the loss upon
the defrauder.
But see Dalton, suj:rra note I, at 1025. Professor Dalton describes the approach based on
determining the genuineness of assent as "unworkable" because "(wle cannot directly know or
ascertain the subjective intent of the rlisfavored party." ld. ; see also Dawson, Economic Duress A11 E.uay in Per$pec!ive. 45 MJCH. L. R~v. 253.266 (1947); Gordon, supra note 17, at 211.
114. R. Coffey, Information Failures: Nature, Significance, Prevention and Rectification 4
(Sept. 12. 1985) (unpublished manuscript) (copy on ftle at Iowa lAw Review) ("information
failu re in securities transactions may . .. allocate total wealth between consumption and
investment in a manner that. is inconsistent with the real range of investment-conmmption
opportunities available").
115. Dalton, supra note I, at I 024 (describing duress as a "public" doctrine "to police the
limits of 'fair' bargain").
116. R. Pos~ER, supra note 19, at 81-82.
IIi. See general(~ supra note 115.
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Last, because the defendant fraud perpetrators in Lockman were
professionals and the plaintiffs were nonprofessionals, 118 imposing the loss
on the former is likely to promote efficient deterrence for another reason.
If the courts consistently impose the loss on the professional wrongdoers,
they will deter a party with incentive to engage in multiple illegal
transactions. 119 Courts can thus achieve greater deterrence at a lower cost.
Of course, it is possible to argue that the defrauder would be the more
difficult party to deter because the fraudulent party might be willing to take
extraordinary risks, including the risk of nonenforcement, to achieve those
profits. Even if one admits the difficulty of deterring the defrauder, the risk
of multiple violations by such parties might j ustify, in efficiency terms, the
costs associated with shifting losses to that party. Moreover, the size of the
expected gains by the defrauder might indicate a willingness by that party
to assume whatever risks might accrue from the transaction, including the
risk of nonenforcement.

2.

Economic Leverage

Courts also appropriately depart from the no-effect rule- through
intervention -on the basis of (1) economic coercion exercised against,120 or
(2) lack of bargaining power by, the party seeking relief. 1 21 Karpinski v .
Collins 122 illustrates the influence of the coercion factor. In Karpinski, the
plaintiff sought recovery of rebates which he alleged he had been coerced
into paying in order to obtain a Grade A milk contract. The defendant
118. Professor Wade pointed om the importance of this distinction in determining
outcome. Wade, supra note 12, at 277-78 ("plaintiff is greatly aided if he can show that the
defcndam is engaged in transactions of this son as a kind o f business"). Professor Wade
explains this distinction in terms of a kind of moral distaste for professional profiteering . Id .
O ne court recognizing the importance of professional status for maximization of deterrence
is Watts v. Malatesta, 262 N.Y. 80, 82, 186 N .E. 210,2 11 (1 933) ("Curb the professional with
his constant offer of temptation ... and you have to a large extent controlled the evil."), cited
in E.A. FAR~SWORTH & w.:F. Y o L':O.:G, Co!\4RAGTS 46R (1988).
119. See .su bra note 118.
120. See, e.g ., Penna Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Pans Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 145
(1968) (White, J., concurring) ("When those with mar ket power and leverage persu ade, coerce,
or influen ce others to cooperate in an illegal combination to their d amage, allowing recovery
to the latter is wholly consistent with the purpose o f § 4, since it will deter those most likely to
be responsible for organizing forbidden schemes."); Greene v. Gc:neral Food s Corp., 517 F.2d
635, 646 (5th Cir. 1975) (denying defendant- who coerced plaintiff, a small businessman, t.o
participate in an antitntst violation - in pari delicto defense because of "disproportionate
bargaining power''), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 942 (1976); set. also CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769
F.2d R42, 856 (1 st Cir . 1985) (h1 pari delicto defense inappropriate against party "overwhelmed
by a party in a super ior bargaining position"); American Motor Inns v. Holiday Inns, 521 F.2d
1230, 1255 (3d Cir. 1975) (denying defendant in pari delicto defense because plaintiff
franchisee was subj ect to dictatorial control of defendant).
A.lrhough courts readily cite coercio n as a factor militating in favor of recovery, the difficulty
of establishing when coercion exists is readily apparent. See generally A. WERTHEI"ER, CorRcro:o.:
(1 987).
121. See Beynon v. Garden Grove Medical Group, 100 Cal. App. 3d 698,705, 16 1 Cal. Rptr.
146, 150 (1980) (granting weaker party avoidance rights because "no evidence that the
agreement was negotiated by parties h aving a parity of bargaining strength"); see also William
]. Davis, Inc. v. Slade, 27 1 A.2d 4 12, 41 5 (D.C. 1970) (rejecting in pari delicto defense because
of "great d isparity in bar gaining position" between landlord and low income tenant).
122 . 2.?2 Cal. A pp. 2d 711 , 60 Cat. Rptr. 846 (1967).
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creamery defended, citing the illegality of the rebates. In rejecting the
defense and in affirming the trial court judgment awarding the plaintiff
restitution of all amounts paid to the defendants, 123 the appeals court relied
on the economic coercion factor. It found that because the "plaintiff was a
small dairyman whose economic survival was dependent upon his ability to
obtain a Grade A milk contract in a localitv where such contracts were
extremely scarce," 12 4 "he was therefore pecu'liarly vulnerable to the exertion of economic coercion by a person such as the defendant ... ."1 2 5
Assuming that the defendant does exercise financial pressure on the
plaintiff, saying in effect "deal with me on these terms or there is no deal at
all,'' 12 6 withholding or denying legal effect to illegal contracts will promote
efficient deterrence. Those who are susceptible to and accede to financial
pressure because they avidly want what the other has to offer (as Karpinski
wanted the Grade A contract) may be substantially motivated to ignore all
risks associated with the achievement of that goal, including the risk of
nonenforcement. In these cases the court may decline to apply the no-effect
rule because it may conclude that those susceptible to economic pressure
will fail to give adequate weight to the nonenforcement cost and consistently will choose to incur the risk of nonenforceability to promote their
own sense of self-interest. Even if the Karpinski scenario is conceptualized
differently, a court still may find it inefficient to apply the no-effect rule
against the farmer. If the farmer lacks alternatives to the dairy by which to
get a Grade A contract and the dairy thereby has sufficient market power
to "force" the farmer to accept the terms of illegal rebates, one may argue
that the farmer has not truly "assented" to the agree ment. 127 It is arguable
that under these circumstances the parties' failure to assign expressly the
risk of nonenforcement does not represent a recognition that the aggregate
interests of the dairy and the farmer will be served by leaving the loss where
it falls, but rather the coercive imposition of that allocation by the dairy on
the farmer.
Regardless of how Karpinski is conceptualized, either as a deliberate
assumption of the risk of enforcement to maximize private interest or as
forced acquiescence in an equal allocation of the risk of nonenforcement,
the court should conclude that the "coerced" party will be a poor candidate
123. The amounts paid to the defendants included $6,500 loaned by the plaintiffs to the
defendants and $4,177.22 in rebates. Id. at 714, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
124. ld.
125. ld.
126. Since this is the choice that confronts parties in most financial transactions, see Dalzell,
supra note 108, at238, conservative theorists argue that parties subject to these choices should
not be considered coerced and should not be granted avoidance rights. See Epstein,
Uncons<ionabilil_y: A Critical ReaPflraisal, 18 J.L. & Eeoc-:. 293, 297 (1 975). Under Epstein's view,
Karpinski was arguably not coerced because he was put to the same choice that others are put
to: forgo either his entitlement (his money in the form of rebates) or a Grade A contract (his
desire).
127. As Professor Dalzell has pointed out, even in cases in which the offeree is presented
with two very unpalatable alrernat.ives from which to choose, the offeree may make a perfectly
rational and deliberate choice of the most desirable (least offensive) alternative. Dalzell, supra
note 108, at 238. On the basis of the above contention Professor Dalzell would p robably
dispute that the choices made, even in the fraud context, are any less consensual than would
ordinarilv be the case.

ILLEGAL CONTRACTS AND EFFICIENT DETERRENCE

145

for the deterrence sanction. The "weaker" party will either ignore the
sanction in self-interest or fail to allocate the risk because of an inability to
bargain over any term.
Demonstrating a plausible basis for why it may be difficult to deter the
victim of the overreaching does not explain why it would be more efficient
to deter the coercing party. For instance, in Karpinski it may be argued that
the dairy is susceptible to the same substantial incentives to ignore the law
and is thus an equally weak candidate for deterrence. If the profits from the
illegal rebates are large and the risk of farmers' lawsuits is small, then
arguably both categories of parties are weak candidates for the deterrence
sanction. If that were the case, then neither party would be a superior risk
bearer of the cost of nonenforcement and shifting the loss from the farmer
to the dairy would seem to achieve no efficiency gains. However, if the
dairy's position as an entity likely to engage in extortion of illegal rebates
from all farmers is taken into account, it may make economic sense to force
the dairy to disgorge the illegal rebates. Otherwise, if the court left the
parties where it found them, the dairy would be able to retain the illegal
rebates. That result would send a message to individual farmers to refrain
from paying these rebates. Farmers would realize that no matter what the
agreement with the dairy, they would never get restitution of the illegal
rebates and so would be more reluctant to pay them in the first place. That
result, however, would be a costly means of achieving deterrence. Individual farmers would have to be educated to the costs of nonenforcement.
Deterrence of farmers might be difficult because farmers, when presented
with the alternatives of paying illegal rebates or losing the contract
altogether, would always opt for the illegal rebate. The incremental costs of
the rebate always would be less than the costs of losing the contract, If
sufficient deterrence can be applied to the dairy to force it to cease
ac(epting the bribe,, then tit(.' practice~ m<l\ c-ease altogether ami it hill not
be neressan to 1,·orn· ahum detf>rring a large number of mdividual farmc1 s.

Another reason why it may be more efficient to deter the dairy, or
comparably situated parties, is that doing so might achieve the result that
the parties would have reached in private negotiation, had the risks about
the illegal rebates been allocated explicitly. Since the profits from the
multiple illegal rebate deals would be large, the dairy presumably would be
willing to take more risks, including the risk that the illegal rebates would
be returned to the customer, in order to secure those profits.
In every case in which the parties both stand to profit from the
illegality, as in Karpinski, the question that needs to be asked is how the loss
from entering into an illegal transaction should be allocated and why. If the
dairy is permitted to retain the illegal rebates, it wm be given an incentive
to engage in multiple illegal transactions, secure in the knowledge that
farmers will never be able to recover the rebates because the "illegality"
would defeat their claims. If, however, the farmer is given a right to rescind
and to recover the rebates in every case, relegating the dairy to no more
than a legal amount in every case, that might act as a potential deterrent to
collecting the illegalities initially. On the other hand, the farmer who has no
desire to pay illegal rebates, and would prefer not to if given the choice,
should be allowed to recover the illegal rebate. Restitution of those amounts
will encourage farmers to sue on the illegal contracts, thus bringing the
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illegality to light and providing the only possible deterrent to the dairy's
illegal practices.

3.

No Constraints Operative Against Either Plaintiff or Defendant

If no apparent constraints operate against either party and both
parties appear to conspire actively and voluntarily to participate in the
wrongdoing, neither party should secure judicial relief. 128 Ryan v. Motor
Credit Co. 129 illustrates this contention. ln Ryan the plaintiff, a used car
dealer with ten years' experience, purchased automobiles from the defendant on credit. A state statute, which governed the extension of credit
between the parties, prohibited any individual from owing more than $300
to a lender.l30 To avoid this dollar limitation, the plaintiff and defendant
conspired to create a dummy loan scheme in which the plaintiff received
loan proceeds from loans made to fictitious persons. When the dealer
defaulted on his loan obligations, the lender brought a replevin action to
recover the unsold cars. The plaintiff and defendant each sought various
forms of relief. The plaintiff (dealer) sought a one-sided voidability right
under which he could avoid his obligations on the promissory notes and
recover monies already paid to the defendant. He also sought a hands-off
policy, which would preclude the lender from succeeding in its replevin
action. The lender sought to enforce a guarantee agreement, which would
protect him in the event of a shortfall upon foreclosure. The court denied
relief to both parties, dismissing the complaint and the counterclaim 131 and
denying the defendant the right to recover the deficiency remaining after
the repossessed automobiles were sold.
In deciding that the plaintiff was not entitled to relief because he was
in pari delicto with the defendant, the court emphasized that the plaintiff
"had previously operated a used car business ... and had borrowed moneys
from small loan companies there." 13 2 In fact, the plaintiff had ten years'
experience as a used car dealer and the defendant was a lender. There were
thus no significant, apparent disparities in status as when one party is
dependent on the other. Moreover, there was no evidence of coercion or
other overreaching by one party against the other. Both parties appeared to
be equal participants in the scheme. Hence. the court applied a "leave-theparties-where-they-are" approach, denying avoidance and restitution rights
to the plaintiff and enforcement rights to the defendant.
In a situation of equality, as in Ryan, the parties are equally deterrable.
Because no clear benefit results when the loss is shifted from one equally
deterrable party to another, it is more cost efficient to leave the parties
where they are. It could be asserted that Ryan is an appropriate case in
which to apply the fountainhead argument against the dealer. Since the
128. See cases cited sufnv note 80.
129. 1:~0 N.J. Eq. 531, 23 A.2d 607 (1941), affd. 132 N.J. Eq. 398,28 A.2d 81 (1942}.
130. The purpose of the stat. me was to make available up to $300 in credit to borrowers who
otherwise coulcl not secure credit. Any further borrowings were subject to the ordinary interest
rate cap of6% (Small Loan Act, ch. 62, Pub. L. No. 1932} (C'\llTent version at N.J. SnT. A:-<:-<.
§ 17: I 0-2 (West 1984)).
131. Ryan, 130 N.J. Eq. at 563.23 A.2d at 625.
132. Id . at 558, 23 A.2d at 622.
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dealer will engage in many potential violations, deterring the dealer
arguably would prevent many more future violations more efficiently than
deterring the individual borrower. In Ryan, however, the borrower actively
conspired with the defendant in order to benefit his business interests, a
result that likely would accrue in every illegal loan in which he participates,
thus indicating that the borrower is likely to engage in multiple future
violations. A rule directed at deterrence of both dealer and borrower,
therefore, makes economic sense.

D. The Degree of Claimant's Participation in the Wrongdoing; t33
Claimant Knowledgeable About, But Not an Active Participant in, the
. Illegality: Relief Granted
Even if the claimant knows of the underlying illegality, she still should
recover if the defendant is the active wrongdoer and the claimant only a
passive participant. 134 Ordinarily, a no-relief rule promotes efficient deter133. See Strong, sufJra note 4. at 376 (discus.~ing importance of participation factor).
134. The Restatemrnl (Second) ~( Conlracts recognizes the possibility of recovet;· even when
the promisee has knowledge "of some improper use that the promisor intends to make of what
he obtains unless the promisee (a) acted for the purpose of furthering the improper use, or (b)
knew of the use and the use involves grave social harm." RrsTA1'B1E'-r (SEco:-;n) or CoNTRACTS
§ 182 (1979). See, e.g., Graves "·johnson, 179 Mass. 53, 57, 60 N.E. 3R3, 383 (1 901 )
("Seemingly the plaintiffs did not act in aid of the defendant's intent beyond selling him the
goods [liquor].''); cases cited in E.A. F.>.R:-;swoRTH. supm nore 3, at § 5.6 n.26; see also cases cited
m(m note 138. One other efficiency concern that may be lurking behind the active/passive
distinction is a concern that a rule detening the less active party may lead to overdeterrence
and thus be inefficient for that reason. Golberg v. Sanglier, 96 Wash. 2d 874, 639 P.2d 1347
(1982), may illustrate this point. In Golberg. the defendant applied for a Cadillac dealership,
agreeing in return to furnish S l 00,000 in unencumbered funds. Since the defendant did not
actually have rhe cash, he recruited three other panners to join him in the venture, each
contributing $3:~.000. Because Cadillac required unencumhered funds, the defendant franchisee misrepresented the source of funds to be a family gift and the partnership agreed to
participate in concealing the true som'Ce of funds. /d. at t\81, 639 P.2d at 1352. After the
partnership was formed. the defendant franchisee began to negotiate to sell the company and
solicited one of the three other partners to participate in a scheme to diveSt the remaining
partners of the stock without revealing the ongoing negotiations for the sale 10 a third party.
Jd. at R77-78, 639 P.2d at 1350. The partner in collusion with the franchisee cominced the
plaintiffs to sell their stock by false statements as to the mismanagement of the company. !d.
When the plaintiffs realil.ed the deception, they sued for damages based on the profits that
could have been realized had they not been fraudulently induced into selling their stock. The
defendants argued that the plaintiffs were precluded from recovering because they had
participated in a violation of the Washington securities laws by concealing from the franchisor
the true source of the funds. !d. at 876-79, 639 P.2d at 1349-50.
The court permitted the suit, citing as its rationale the exception tO the nonenforcement ru le
which arises when the parties are not in pori delictn. Jd. at 882-88, 639 P.2d at 1352-56. T he
t·esult also is explainable in terms of the Jess extensive participation by the plaimiffs. A mncern
with efficient deterrence also may explain the result. First, the petitioners alleged that they
believed the transaction to be legal and thus would be diffimlt to deter. Second, the alleged
fraud on the franchisor was a relatively harmless error since the partnership had agreed not
to recover profits until the franchisor was paid off. Thus, the \'iolation was merely a technical
one and penalizing the investors for their participation in the nonmaterial violation might act
to deter future invest.ors from future deals. The punishment (denial of remedy) thus would be
disproportionate to the offense and therefore might result in ovcrcaution. Mmeover, the court
clearly found the more active wrongdoer and opporrunist to be rhe franchisee. By permitting
the likely repeat offender to prevail, the court would deprive itself of the opportunity to deter
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renee when the parties are equally knowledgeable about the illegality. This
principle, however, will not apply in cases in which one of the equally
knowledgeable parties plays a more active role in the wrongdoing than the
other knowledgeable party.
Holman v. johnsont35 illustrates the impact that differential participation in the illegal scheme may have on the outcome of a case in which the
parties have equal knowledge of the illegality. In Holman, the plaintiff
agreed to sell tea to the defendant, who intended to smuggle it into
England. When the defendant refused to pay for the goods delivered, the
plaintiff brought an action for the agreed price. Since the contract was
made and completed in Dunkirk where the sale was legal, the court was
faced with the question of whether the plaintiffs cause of action transgressed the laws of England. The court found the plaintiff guilty of no
offense, 136 concluding that the plaintiffs knowledge of the illegal purpose
was insufficient to render the contract unenforceable. The court distinguished the case of "a bargain which is to be paid in case the vendee should
succeed in landing the goods" 137 from the facts of the case before it on the
ground that the plaintiff was indifferent to the outcome of the smuggling
operation and approached the transaction as he would any legitimate sale
of goods.
How does the plaintiffs "concern in the transaction" and degree of
participation in the illegality relate to the goal of efficient deterrence? 138 If
a court wishes to maximize efficient deterrence and is faced with the choice
ofleaving the parties where they are or intervening to grant relief, it should
intervene on behalf of the wrongdoer that is clearly less active. First,
imposing the loss on a passive, though knowledgeable, participant may lead
to overdeterrence of even legitimate transactions. Even if the seller in
the fountainhead of crime and thus be inefficient in its administration of sanctions.
135 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (1775).
136. The court stressed that because the sale of the tea occurred in Dunkirk, where such a
sale was legal. it alone did not constitllle an unlawful offense. !d. at 1120-22.
137. !d. at 1121.
138. Other courts have echoed the view that the degree of participation in the wrongdoing
is a relevant factor in resolving questions of relief. See, e.g., California Pac. Bank \'. Small
Business Admin., 557 F.2d 21R, 21 9-20 (9th Cir. 1977) (parties in pari delicto when bank
masterminded scheme to evade federal law requiring assumption of 10% of risk and SBA
failed to exercise requisite oversight); Severance v. Knight-Counihan Co., 29 Cal. 2d 561, 569,
I i7 P.2d 4. 8·9 (1947) (denying recovery when both parties took role in agreement to defraud
creditors); Woodward v. Jacobs, 541 .P.2d 691, 692 (Colo. 1975) (denying relief when both
parties '"active participants..); State\'. AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, 293 Minn. 342, 348,
199 N.W.2d 444, 44H (1972) (denying relief to party whose participation was "both knowing
and willing"'); International Aircraft Sales v. Betancourt, 582 S.\..,' .2d 632, 635 (fex. 1979) ("if
vendor in any way aids the vendee in his unlawful design to violate the law, such participation
will render void the contract of sale and will bar recovery"}; Blossom Farm .Prods. v. Kasson
Cheese Co.. 133 Wis. 2d 386. 392, 395 N.W.2d 619, 622 (1986) (denying claim for contract
price because of plaintiff's "knowledgeable involvement in [defendant'sl improper conduct"");
see also .Pinter v. Dahl, 108 S. Ct. 2063, 2074 (1988} (plaintiff purchaser's suit ..should not be
barred where his promotional efforts are incidental to his role as investor"); Comment,
Anlitrusl: Limiting In Pari Delicto as a Defense to Treble Damage Actions, 53 MINN. L. REv. 1!27, 828
(1969) (in pari <Ulicto denies recovery to an ··acti,·e participant in an illegal or morally
delinquent scheme..). The impact of the participation fac10r also is illustrated bv cases in which
less extensive participation in the wrongdoing by one party may persuade a court that judicial
recovery for that party should be available.
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Holman knew of the defendant's intended illegal purpose, the defendant
still could change his mind and use the goods for a legal purpose. If one
adopts a rule that prohibits potential sellers from entering into transactions
with any purchaser who initially has an illicit purpose, then even perfectly
legal transactions (those in which the defendant changes the intended use
to a legal one) will be deterred.
Second, it also may be more efficient to deter the more active
participant because the court may thereby reach the source of the wrong. 139
Because it is likely that each active wrongdoer will engage in more than one
illegal transaction, imposing the disincentive on this party will cast a wider
net of deterrence.
Finally, in cases in which the passive party has no particular interest in
the illegal aspect of the transaction-she stands to gain no more from the
illegal transaction than from an ordinary transaction 140 -while the active
wrongdoer stands to profit by the extraordinary gains associated with an
illegal transaction, the active party's incentive to enter into such illegal
transactions will be greater. Because the expected gain will be grea·t, there
is a greater incentive for active parties to engage in multiple illegal future
transactions. It is more important, therefore, to deter the active party and
stifle this additional incentive. It is less important to deter the passive party
because, when given the choice, such a party is not inclined to choose an
illegal transaction because the profit obtained from each transaction (legal
or illegal) will be identical.
Another case in which the degree of participation affected the
outcome of the case is Greene v. Brooks. 141 In Greene the parties entered into
a partnership of a supper dub, in which each partner was to have
responsibility for different facets of the business. The defendant was to
make all decisions regarding the bar. When the plaintiff partners sued for
an accounting, the defendant used the illegality defense, alleging that the
license had been illegally issued in the defendant's name only. The court
rejected the defense and allowed the plaintiffs to recover despite the
"technical" illegality. 142 Although the Greene court rationalized the outcome
in terms of the greater fault of the defendant, 143 the decision also is
explicable in terms of relative participation and efficient deterrence. Since
139. The importance of deterring the source of the wrongdoing has prompted courts to
impose liability on corporate insiders and broker-dealers in the securities law context. As one
court explained.
The tme insider or the broker-dealer is at the fountainhead of the confidential
information .... If the prophylactic purpose of the law is to restrict the use of all
material inside information until it is made available to the investing public, then the
most effective means of carrying out this policy is to nip in the bud the source of the
information, the tipper, by discouraging him from "making the initial disclosure
which is the ftrst step in the chain of dissemination."
Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin , Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (citing
Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700. 706 (5th Cir. 1969) (Godbold, J., dissenting)).
140. This may not be true in every instance. and if the less active wrongdoers stood lO gain
extraordinary profits, their incemives to enter illegal transactions would be greater.
141. 235 Cal. App. 2d 161, 45 Cal. Rptr. 99 (1965).
142. !d. at 169, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
143. !d.
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the defendant had control of the bar, it was more efficient to direct the
sanction against him. Otherwise, if the defendant were allowed to defeat
the accounting action, future parties in the plaintiffs' position will be
required to take on an oversight role of the other partners' activities, which
will involve significant costs. The courts should direct the fl>anction at the
party who actively sought to keep the copartner's name off the license and
thus target the deterrence at those considering whether to engage in this
type of behavior in the future. 144

E.

The Benefit to the Defendant and Claimant from Wrongdoing 14 5

The windfall factor also should affect a court's assessment of which
party is in the best position to be deterred. If nonenforcement produces a
windfall gain which, because of the likely sequence of the parties' performances, regularly accrues to one party rather than the other, the recipient
of the windfall gain will have a strong incentive to commit the violation and
rely on the no-effect rule as a defense to liability. 146 If the other party does
not stand to gain a similar windfall from the no-effect rule, he will have less
incentive to enter illegal contracts. When the incentives to violate the law or
public policy are unequal, it makes economic sense to apply the relief rules
in a manner that will remove the stronger incentive.1 47

1.

Differential Benefits

The Gates 146 case, which involved the employment of an illegal alien,
illustrates differential incentives to commit violations. If one assumes that
employers regularly pay their employees for services already rendered, 14 'l
the employer and the employee would have different incentives to enter an
illegal contract. The employer will have a positive incentive to hire persons
in violation of the immigration laws because he will regularly secure a
windfall. Moreover, because of his superior position and status , he is more
likely to know of the no-effect rule and thus be able to exploit it to his
advantage. He is likely to perceive that he can obtain services and
subsequently use the no-effect rule as a defense if the alien sues for wages.
Imposition of a no-recovery rule in such contexts will provide a strong
144. This case also may be explained in terms of differential incentives to commit
illegalities. See infra texr accompanying notes 148-56.
145. For a discussion of the benefit factor, see Wade, wpm note 4 , at 48-51, 52-53.
146. Wade, supra n ote 4 , at 55 ("To a defrauder, the knowledge that the law will permit him
to keep !.11-gotten gains will be an incemive to induce another to participate in an illegal
contract. ).
147. In cases in which o ne party r egularly benefits more than the other, courts should
allocate the risk of loss to the party receiving these greater benefits because, had the parties
negotiated privately, this party would have been more likely to assume the risk of nonenforcement, speculating that the benefits would outweigh the costs.
148. See supra note 61.
149. Of course, one might wonder why the worken do not stop working or demand daily
payment to avoid the potential risks of n o npayment when the employer retains the right to p ay
at the end of a period. It may be that the worker lacks the information about the risks o f
nonpayment which might, if known. affect the worker's willingness to assume the risks of
periodic payment and the concomitant l'isk of nonpayment.
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incentive to employers to commit future violations to reduce the cost of
doing business. Allowing the alien to recover simply will permit the
employer to break even by paying for services received. In neither instance
will the employer incur a loss. The illegal worker, on the other hand, will
not have the same positive incentive to enter these agreements because he
will not obtain a \Vindfall profit from working in violation of the immigration laws. If the employer pays him, either voluntarily or by judicial
decision, the employee simply will break even, receiving compensation for
work already completed. If. however, the court invokes the nonenforcement rule, the alien will suffer a net loss. In neither instance will the alien
secure a windfall as the employer does when the contract is not enforced.
Thus, one explanation for the result in Gates and similar cases 150 is that the
courts are concerned with deterring illegal behavior as effectively as
possible. It makes economic sense to deter the employer and others who,
because of the likely sequence of the parties' performance, stand to gain a
windfall from the no-effect rule. Parties who will receive windfalls regularly
are likely to enter into multiple illegal transactions which will be advantageous to themYH Thus, deterring those with greater incentive to commit
illegalities is more efficient because it may help to prevent many future
violations. 152
150. See supra note 65.
!51. Courts and commentators have voiced a concern with the adYer.~e impact on
deterrence that a windfall benefit might have. See, e.g., Gellhorn, supra note 9, at 689. Professm
Gellhom treats a ca~e involving a claim for overtime wages by an employee who worked in
excess of the statutorily permitted mmdmwn of eight hours a dav. In discussing the state court
decision finding the employee guiltv of ,·iolating the .5tatute and dem·ing him a claim for the
overtime, Gellhorn states that '"If the decision affected the policy of limiting work-hours, it
could affect it only adversely, since the emplm·et· wa~ assured immunitv against the necessity
of paying wages for an~· over-time services."' ld.
152. The likelihood of fmure and recurrent windfalls is likely to arise in the context of
unlicensed contractors and professionals. In these cases an unlicensed professional such as an
architect performs services: when she sues to recover her fee. the owner refuses to pay. citing
the illegality in the failure to obtain a licen~c. E.g., Wilson v. Kealakekua Ranch, 57 Haw. 124,
125,551 P.2d 525,526 (1976). Sometimes the courts deny the professional all recovery. Sec,
e.g., Douglas v. Sm~tlski, 20 Conn. Supp. 236,239, 131 A.2d 225, 226 (1957) (becau~e plaintiff
wa~ not licensed as an architect. he could not recover for the value of architectural services
rendered). Jn other cases, the court may allow recovery citing such factors as substantial
compliance with the licensing re<juircments, see, e.g.• Latipac, Inc. v. Superior Court of Marin
County, 49 Cal. Rptr. 67[), [)H0-8!, 411 P.2d ;>64, 568-69 (1961)) (plaintiff contra(tor
substantially complied with licensing requirement by holding valid liccn~e at time of contracting and by renewing it just after performance), the absence of harm to the public from
permitting the recovery, see, e.g., Vitek, Inc. v. Alvarado Ice Palace. 34 Cal. App. 3d 586,
594-95, 110 Cal. Rptr. RG. 92 (1973) (contractor who received v;tlid license one day after
contract was signed did not undermine ··wnmory purposes of public protection"), or the mere
revenue raising purpose of the statute. Se.• 6A A. Coks'"• .HtfmJ note 4, § 1527.
Application of efficient deterrence theory and the differential benefit factor suggests
explanatory reasons why recovery should be readily allowed in such case.~. lf the owner is
allo1~ed to escape payment for services rendered even when the violation of the licensing
statute is merely technical or there is no harm to the public because the professional is duh·
qualified, owners will have an incentiYe to hire unlicensed professionals. Jt still is possible.
however, to rationalize the no-cffen rule for unlic:ensed professionals in terms of efficient
deterrence. The contractor is the party most likely to know whether she is licensed and is in the
best position to effect compliance at the least cost. In 1·iew of this factor, denial of remverv still
may be appropriate.
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A potential counterargument to a scheme of loss allocation directed at
the party who benefits most regularly from nonenforcement is that it may
be easier to deter the party who does not have an extraordinary stake. Thus,
courts could achieve a greater likelihood of success if they directed the
losses of the illegal venture against the party with the lesser stake. The
indifferent party would more readily give up the illegality because it means
little to her. However, the very factors that cause one of the parties to
expect a greater potential benefit from the illegality also make that party a
likely "repeat offender.'' Therefore, it may be more efficient to deter him
for that reason.

2.

Equal Benefit from Wrongdoing; Fortuity of Loss

In contrast to the cases in which differential incentives propel the
party who stands to secure a windfall to violate the law, courts should take
a different approach in cases involving conspiracies in which there is
neither a regular or identifiable sequence of performance, and thus no
party regularly securing a windfall, nor market imperfections in the form of
informational disparities. [n these cases the courts should apply the
no-effect rule when either party seeks judicial relief of any kind. t53 For
example, in Russellv. Soldinger 154 both parties actively conspired to suppress
the bidding on a parcel of land at a probate sale. The parties agreed not to
bid against each other, with the bidder to take title jointly with the party
who dropped out of the bidding process. The defendant-bidder then
refused to convey a proportionate interest in the legal title to the plaintiff
who had dropped out of the bidding in accordance with the agreement.
The plaintiff sued for a declaration of a constructive trust and filed a
motion demanding a title transfer, or the alternative of monetary damages.
The trial court granted a nonsuit to the defendants. 155
On appeal the court affirmed the judgment for the defendants,
finding the agreement void and unenforceable. 156 Although the court did
not discuss the case in terms of the benefit factor and its effect on
deterrence, application of the no-effect rule is consistent with the judicial
goal of efficiently maximizing deterrence. Thus, in Russell it is difficult to
identify a class of pe rsons or conspirators in advance who will be more likely
to gain a windfall, even though an individual party may later secure a
windfall on an ad hoc basis. Nothing in the facts indicates one class of
persons will routinely bear the initial loss and thus be forced to seek judicial
intervention just to break even while the other party will regularly receive
the initial benefit and then a windfall profit upon the imposition of the
153. See, e.g., Danebo Lumber Co.,.. Koutsky-Brennan-Vana Co., 182 F.2d 489, 495 (9th
Cir. !950) (denying restitmionary recoverv to active co-conspirators in violation of Emergency
Price Act). cert. demed. 340 lJ .S. 830 (1950); Woodward v.Jacobs, 541 P.2d 691,692 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1975) (denying relief when both parties knowingly and actively conspired tO ,·iolate
zoning laws): Sinnar \'.LeRoy, 44 Wash. 2d 728, 7:H, 270 P.2d 800, R02 (1954) (refusing to
aid either party and denying restitutionary recovery when both parties conspired to violate
liquor laws).
15.4. 59 Cal. App. 3d 633, 131 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1976).
155. !d. at 640, 13 1 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
156. !d. at 642. 131 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
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no-effect rule. Instead, each party has an equal chance of suffering from
the other party's breach by nonperformance. Because it is fortuitous as to
which party initially will bear the loss, neither party has a greater incentive
than the other to commit the illegality. In this situation, the court should
apply the no-effect rule and leave the parties in the same position in which
they exist. Shifting the loss will not enhance deterrence, and thus there is no
reason to generate the costs of such loss shifting. The pattern of fortuitous
losses will provide the same level of deterrence as would judicial intervention.

IV.

DocTRINAL ExcEPTIONS REEXAMINED: Do THEIR APPLICATIONS
REFLECT A UNIFIED THEORY OF EFFICIENT DETERRENCE?

Apart from the factual variants to the no-effect rule as described
above, courts also have developed several doctrinal exceptions to the
illegality rule. 157 These doctrines are applied differently in different factual
contexts.l58 When viewed individually, like the factual variants, each
appears to be an unrelated exception rather than part of a comprehensive
judicial approach to the treatment of illegal contracts. The doctrinal
distinctions themselves seem unable to predict case outcome. Efficient
deterrence theory, however, as embodied in the factors explored in Section
II, provides an explanation for the variability in the applications of the
doctrinal exceptions. Courts should articulate and apply effective deterrence theory as their rule of decision rather than continuing to rely on
imperfect doctrinal categories.

157. Professor Gellhorn describes many of these doctrines used by courts to differentiale
enforceable contracts from those to be denied effect.
[C]ourts have undertaken to differentiate their decisions according to whether the
contracts in auestion related to mala Prohibita or mala in se-"that acute distinction
bt-t"(·t·n >Mi111•1 1r. ;,nd ''"'' f"olllbltO;,. hi< h ht'iu..l ,o 'hre.,·d Jnd '"un<lmg '" prell\ ,
.llld hemg m L:mn. l..l\ th• 'on of ~n occil~ton to h .. \t. Jn\ me;,mn~ torr. ~rcordmgl\'
ot h.~~ none" Furrhcr di,tin~tivns h<t,~· ht•t·n rn;rde het,,·een cc_,ntr.K" "hi,h <:omra·
vened statutes designed solely for revenue purposes and, on the other hand, statutes
which were intended to be prohibitory or which stated conditions "for the benefit of
the public"; but the difficulty of drawing the line between the one type and the other
vitiates the effectiveness of the distinction, and in any event it is unrealistic to say that
the legislature intended or that it did not intend that contracts should be held invalid
if in violation of such statutes .... [C]ourts have also spun fine t.heories concerning
''collateral illegality" and "new and independent considerations."
Gellhom, supra note 9, at 683 (footnotes omitted). Professor Gellhorn is critical of many of
these doctrines, which are relied on to justify a result of recovery or no recovery, because he
does not think that they answer the ba.~ic underlying question of all illegal contracts: "Should
this particular contract be enforced as being consonant with public policy?" !d. at 683 n.22.
158. Professor Corbin illustrates the difficulty with one of the doctrines-the malum in
sefmalum prohibitum distinction-when he states that "the falsity of the distinction, as expressed
in the L'ltin phrases, rests in the assumption, made throughout so many centuries, that right
and wrong are absolutes and that a mere human being can draw an absolute and unva rying
line between good and evil." 6A A. CoRs1s, supra note 4, at§ 1378.
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Forfeiture

One doctrinal exception to the no-effect rule cited by commentators is
the antiforfeiture principle. 159 The Restatement (Second) ~f Contracts reflects
that principle: "In weighing the interest in the enforcement of a term,
account is taken of ... any forfeiture that would result if enforcement were
denied ...." 16° Furthermore, the Restatement reflects solicitude for a party
that has partly performed by providing that a party may claim restitution if
"denial of restitution would cause disproportionate forfeiture." 161 The
doctrine suggests that courts consider the avoidance of forfeiture an
important goal in fashioning judicial relief. Jn2
The antiforfeiture doctrine, however, appears flimsy and manipulable, since courts are willing to tolerate forfeiture in some imtances but not
in others. A court is more likely to find "disproportionate'' forfeiture in
cases demonstrating unequal status or knowledge 16 3 and to find tolerable,
nonremediable forfeiture when the parties appear to have no apparent
disparities of knowledge, status, or degree of participation in the wrongdoing, or when the plaintiff has superior status. 16 -;~ Courts, however, often
fail to justify the differential willingness to tolerate forfeiture. Instead,
when granting recovery, courts invoke the judicial dislike of forfeiture
principle. In other cases, even when the party seeking recovery has
conferred a measurable benefit, courts denying relief simply do not discuss
the antiforfeiture principle.
Two contrasting cases will help illustrate the differential willingness of
courts to tolerale forfeiture. In Brand v. Elledge 165 the olaintiff was a recent
widow whom the defendant induced to invest over $11,000 in a tavern.
They formed a partnership but when the copartners applied for a joint
liquor license, the superintendent advised the plaintiff she did not yet
qualify because of her short state residence. As a result, the license was
issued in the defendant's name only. Thereafter, the defendant repeatedly
159. Su, e.g., E.A. FA~,.;swoR.Tll, supra note 3, ~ !i.9, at 364; Wade, supra note 4, at 52.
loO. RtsT.\TDt£"' (Sr.co:-.-o) or CoxTRAC:TS § 178 (1979).
16l. Id. at§ 197.
162. Cnder the present scheme, however, a court often will ignore even the presence of
por.ential forfeiture if the harm of the illegal contract is particularly grave. See RtSTATF.\tFXT
(Stco-.:[)) OF C"" rRACTS § 197 comment b ( 1979) ("if the claimant has threatened grave social
harm, no forfeiture will be disproportionate").
16:~. Su, e.g., Brand\'. Elledge, 89 Arir.. 200, 206, 360 P.2d 213, 218 (1961) (granting
recovery to recent widow without business experience against defendant "some years older"
and "experienced in business").
164. See, e.g., Russell v. Soldinger, 59 Cal. App. 3d 633, 641, 131 Cal. Rptr. 145, 150 (1976)
(denying recovery to party who conspired with defendant to suppress bidding despite
resulting windfall to defendant); Woodward v. jacobs, 541 P.2d 691, 692 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975)
(denying recovery to contractor who conspires with owner to violate zoning regulations despite
windfall to owner); Ryan v. Motor Credit Co., 130 N.J. Eq. 531,534.23 A.2d 607, 611,613
(1941) (denying recovery to party who conspired to create loan scheme despite fact that lender
received windfall by receiving illegal sums),n{fd, 132 N.J. Eq. 398,28 A.2d 181 (1942); Parsky
Funeral Home, Inc. v. Shapiro, 83 Misc. 2d 566, 570, 372 N.Y.S.2d 288, 293 (1975) (denying
recovery to funeral establishment suing for p1·ice of services rendered despite windfall to
consumer); Sinnar v. LeRoy, 44 Wash. 728, 731, 270 P.2d 800, 802 (1954) (denying relief to
coconspirator despite coconspirator's windfall of $450).
165. 89 Ariz. 200, 360 P.2d 213 (1961).
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assured the plaintiff that a formal reissuance of the license was not
necessary and urged the plaintiff to trust her. 156
When the plaintiff sought an accounting, the defendant alleged the
partnership was void because the liquor license was issued in violation of
the law requiring all partners to be licensed. The lower court dismissed the
action, finding that because the parties were in pari delicto, neither was
entitled to relief. 1fi 7 The appellate court reversed and decided that the
plaintiff was nevertheless entitled to an accounting due to a number of
factors, including (I) the plaintiffs lack of business experience and (2) the
potential forfeiture of her initial investment. 168
In other cases, however, the possibility of a forfeiture and consequent
windfall to a party does not prompt the court to remedy the forfeiture by
granting enforcement or restitution. In Sinnar v. Le Roy 169 two parties
actively conspired to violate the liquor license laws. The plaintiff paid $450
to the defendant for use in illegally securing a liquor license. When the
defendant failed to deliver the license, the plaintiff sued for the return of
the $450 but the court refused all relief. 170
The results of these cases suggest the deficiencies of the antiforfeiture
principle as a comprehensive explanatory theory. The theory fails to
distinguish those cases in which a benefit conferred is compensated from
those in which it is not. A more reliable explanation for predicting the
remediability of forfeiture emerges from the factual guidelines set forth in
Section II. These factors in turn help identify which results will promote
efficient deterrence. Thus, in Brand, the facts show that differential
incentives to commit illegalities existed between the parties. The plaintiff
attempted to persuade the defendant to reapply for the license in their joint
names but encountered resistance from the defendant; she lacked control
over the defendant. Since the plaintiff had attempted to effect compliance
and indeed had a vested interest in achieving compliance to assure her
rights to the partnership profits, denying her recovery would not advance
the goal of deterrence. 171 Thus, because of the differing interests in
achieving legal compliance, it would not make economic sense to deter
those parties who already have an economic interest in compliance. It
makes sense, however, to grant the plaintiff her accounting claim. Otherwise, a party with a vested interest in noncompliance (such as a partner who
wishes to take all of the profits) will receive a windfall, prompting that party
to engage in other illegal joint ventures. Moreover, courts that deny relief
in such situations might overdeter and discourage parties from entering
166. ld. at 202, 360 P.2d at 215.
167. /d. at 206, 360 P.2d at 218.
168. ld.
169. 44 Wash. 2d 728, 270 P.2d 800 (1954)
170. !d. at 731, 270 P.2d at 802.
171. A similar argument could be made in the context of unlicensed contractors who have
made every effort to effectuate compliance but have failed to achieve total compliance for a
short period of time. See, e.g., Latipac, Inc. v. Superior Court of Marin County, 49 Cal. Rptr .
676.679, 411 P.2d 564, 567 (1966). In such cases, a denial ofrecovcry to the contractor would
seem an unnecessary sanction. doing little to encourage greater compliance.
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business transactions because even if they take steps to assure legal
compliance, they will be denied recovery based on their inability to control
the other parties' actions.
On the other hand, it makes no economic sense to differentiate
between parties if both are parties to a conspiracy as in Sinnar or Russell. In
practical effect, therefore, there is no universal antiforfeiture doctrine.
Instead, courts that rely on the concept are in fact applying the factual
elements discussed in Section II. The differential use of the forfeiture
doctrine, therefore, is best explained by efficient deterrence. Those factual
predictors are examined and the results are manipulated to maximize
efficient deterrence.

B.

Protected Class Doctrine

Another well-recognized exception to the no-effect rule provides that
if a party belongs to a class of persons whom the law was intended to
protect, "there is no policy against the enforcement of the promise by one
who belongs tO that class."l 7 2 A court is more likely to permit a party to an
illegal bargain to recover if the statutory prohibition is directed at conduct
of the party against whom recovery is sought. The usefulness of the
protected class doctrine, however, is limited. If its factual applications are
considered, it becomes possible to "decode" 173 the doctrine and articulate
an underlying efficient deterrence theory which seems to account for
variations in the doctrinal applications.
At first this doctrinal exception appears so noncontroversial and
"mechanical"174 that it would not appear to provide any basis for finding
implicit judicial logic connecting it to any other doctrine or to efficient
deterrence concerns. While the principle of protecting the class that is the
object of legislative protection seems simple, the judiciary still must (1)
decide how to best protect that class, (2) determine who belongs in that
class, and (3) determine what effect, if any, it will give to the contract. 175
Courts do not make these judgments solely on mechanical grounds of
whom the legislature protected since such provisions often do not address
what effect will be given to a contract when the statute is violated.t76 Even
when a statute carves out a protected class for solicitude, courts refuse to
protect class members if certain facts are present. In fact, the courts'
application of the doctrine often is consistent with the pattern of efficient
172. RESTATEMENT (SEcoNo) oF CoNTRACTS§ 179 comment c (1979); see aL~o 6A A. CoRBIN, supra
note 4, § 1540 ("If a bargain is illegal, not because a performance promised under it is an illegal
performance, but only because the party promising it is forbidden by statute or ordinance to
do so, the prohibition is aimed at that party and he is the only wrongdoer."); E.A. FARNSw ORTil,
.mpra note 3, § 5.9. at 366.
173. Dalton, supra note 1, at 1009.
174. Wade, supra note 12, at 270.
175. Gellhorn, supra note 9, at 691. Many courts have been unwilling to admit that in
deciding what effect, if any, to give to a contract involving some illegality or policy violation,
they are exercising independent judgment. "The difficulty has lain in their general unwillingness to accept realistically the proposition that the legislature when adopting a penal
statute, has rarely had in mind the problems of contract law that may later arise." /d. at 682.
176. !d. at 682-83.
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deterrence already described. 177
Parsk.'Y Funeral Home, Inc. v. Shapiro 178 illustrates a situation in which
the court relies on the protected class doctrine to deny recovery to a
nonprotected class member in his suit against a consumer-a statutory
beneficiary. In Parsky, the plaintiff was a funeral establishment seeking
payment on a contract for funeral services or, alternatively, for a quantum
meruit recovery. The defendant moved for summary judgment to dismiss
the complaint, arguing the illegality doctrine.l79
The issue that the court considered in deciding the summary judgment motion was whether the plaintiffs failure to comply with a statute
requiring disclosure of funeral costs precluded a contractual or quasicontractual recovery. To resolve that issue, the court considered who
constituted the intended statutory beneficiaries of the disclosure regulation.
The court found that because the statute was aimed at protecting the
public, of which the defendant was a member, it denied the plaintiff any
measure of recovery. The court emphasized the inherent inequality in the
status and access to information between the funeral establishment and the
consumer. 180
A different application of the protected class doctrine is illustrated by
Ryan v. Motor Credit Co. 181 In Ryan, the court denied an auto dealer relief
when he set up a dummy loan scheme with his lender 182 despite the fact
that he was a member of a class purportedly protected by statute. The
plaintiff car dealer in this case was a borrower whom the statutes ostensibly
were intended to protect. While the court recognized that borrower status
created a presumption that he was entitled to favorable treatment by the
court, 183 the court undertook a careful factual analysis to justify the
application of a no-effect rule. In doing so, it began with the proposition
thatthe normal presumption favoring the borrower is founded on assumptions that most borrowers need protection because of their "credulity and
susceptibility to oppression by reason of ... necessitous circumstances." 1 " 4
The court then systematically proceeded to show that the prevalent
imperfections that ordinarily affect borrowers were not present in the Ryan
177. See, e.g. , Winswn v. Bourgeois, Bennett, Thokey & Hickey, 432 So . 2d 936, 940 (La.
Ct. App. 1983). In Winston the court had to decide whether the noncompetition covenant in
a partnership agreement violated a statute prohibiting covenants required by employers. In
resolving the statutory interpretation issue, the court engaged in a functional analysis of the
relationship of the partner to the partnership to determine if it was equivalent to an
employment relationship. While writing in terms of the protected class doctrine , the court
actually looked to factors such as the absence of duress and disparity in bargaining power in
deciding how to apply the doctrine. ld. at 940; see also Bodily v. Parkmont Village Green
Homeowners Ass'n, 104 Cal. App. 3d 340, 163 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1980) (granting recovery to
homeowners as protected parties under statute requiring notification to department of
changes in offering of real estate projen, and denying recovery to developer, who is most
efficient party to sanction, as party in charge of filings).
178. 83 Misc. 2d 566, 372 N .Y.S.2d 288 (197 5).
179. ld . at 566, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
180. Id. at 568-70, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 292.
181. 130 N.J. Eq. 531, 23 A.2d 607 (1941)
182. !d. at 533 -38, 563, 23 A.2d at 610-13, 62 5.
183. Id . at 556, 23 A.2d at 615-22.
184. ld. at 558, 23 A.2d at 623 .
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facts. In finding the borrower to be in pari delicto with the lender, the court
emphasized several factors including the absence of oppression, the conspiratorial nature of the parties' dealings, and the borrower's knowledge of
the illegality.t 85 Thus, although the protected class doctrine theoretically
was available, the court's analysis in determining whether recovery should
be allowed was factual and based on efficient deterrence factors.
The results of cases in which one of the parties is in a potential class of
statutory beneficiaries demonstrate that the presence of the protected
status alone is not sufficient to decide what effect, if any, to give to the
illegal contract and how to best achieve protection of a statutorily protected
class. The deciding factors that seem to predict whether, and in what
manner, the potential statutory beneficiary will be protected are the
efficient deterrence factors discussed in Section II. Although courts often
explain their outcomes in terms of (I) what the legislature intended and (2)
the protected class doctrine itself, the differential treatment afforded
protected statutory beneficiaries in Ryan and Parsky suggests a different
operative explanation.
If there are market imperfections in terms of knowledge or bargaining
power, a court may permit the disadvantaged party to recover. If, however,
there are no market imperfections in terms of knowledge or participation,
as in Ryan, even the fact that the claimant technically is a statutory class
member may not be sufficient to justify recovery. Thus, courts manipulate
this doctrine, like the others previously discussed, to foster efficient
deterrence. In a sense, in deciding which statutory beneficiaries can recover
and which cannot, the court is considering efficient deterrence factors
which may predict how generalized classes will respond to a recovery/no
recovery outcome. If the court granted recovery to the statutorily protected
claimants in Ryan, the court would be reallocating losses in a case in which
both parties have an equal incentive to engage in the illegality and are
knowledgeable enough to respond to the directives. That result would be
inefficient. However, when the statutory class has inherent or likely traits
which impair its ability to be deterred in an effective, efficient manner,
courts will reallocate losses.

185. ld. at 558-60, 23 A.2d at 622-23. Another case in which the protected class doctrine
theoretically was available to a claimant who nevertheless was denied relief is Howard v.
Sanson , :375 S.W.2d 828 (Ky. 1964). In Howard, a wate1· commissioner-also an attorney-and
a contractor set up a scheme under which the water commissioner would receive illegal
kickbacks for steering work to the contractor. When the contractor sued to recover the
payments made to the attomev, he won at trial. A state statute arguably empowered the
contractor as diem to recover , on motion , monies collected bv his attorncv. See Kv. Rn. STAT.
A~-.... § 418.005 (MichiefBobbs-Merrill 1970). The court, h~wever, refu;ed to consider the
kickbacks to be "money collected" so as to allow the diem to recover. In reaching that
interpretation, the court found that "it i~ not a matter of [the attorney's) taking undue
advantage of his fellow wrongdoer." Howa·rd , 3i5 S.W.2d at 829. Thus, in deciding who was
protected by the statut.e, the court found the relative status of the parties to be a relevant
factor.
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The Collateralness Principle

Under a third doctrinal gloss on the no-effect rule, the courts grant
relief in cases in which the illegality is "remote" but deny relief when the
illegality is "inherent" in the transaction. 186 The collateralness doctrine's
usefulness seems limited because courts apply it randomly across a broad
spectrum of cases. The doctrine is difficult to apply because no precise rule
exists to distinguish between actions that are "collateral" to the illegality and
those that are not. The difficulty disappears, however, once it is recognized
that the doctrine's actual application depends upon the factual situation in
which the case arises rather than upon any specific "collateralness" rule.
These factual distinctions demonstrate that courts achieve results consistent
with efficient deterrence.
Kansas City Hydraulic Brick Co. v. National Surety Co. 187 indicates that
courts look to the relative positions of the parties and label the illegality as
"collateral" or not, depending upon which result will deter future illegal
contracts more efficiently. In Kansas City, the defendant was the surety of a
general contractor (Atkins) who had completed several streetpaving jobs
for Kansas City. The plaintiff was the assignee of a subcontractor who had
supplied brick to Atkins and had not been paid for it. When the subcontractor sued for payment, the surety asserted the illegality defense, arguing
that the contracts between Atkins and the city had not been competitively
bid, as required by statute, and that the plaintiff knew this. The trial court
directed a verdict in favor of the defendant, holding that the illegality of the
contracts between Atkins and the citv also made the contracts between
Atkins and the plaintiff unenforceable. On appeal the Eighth Circuit
reversed and remanded the case with directions to grant a new trial,
holding that the contracts to supply brick were separate and independent of
the illegal contracts between Atkins and the city . 188
Initially, it appears that the no-effect rule would best effectuate the
goal of efficient deterrence, despite the fact that the contract sued upon was
untainted. Because both parties knew of the illegality, 189 both could be
deterred from engaging in future agreements of this type. The court,
however, rejected the nonenforcement rule, stating that "knowledge alone
would not defeat [the] right of recovery" 19° and that to so hold "would affix
to a vendor's knowledge vitiating results beyond anything required by
judicial authority or sound public policy." 191
The efficient deterrence theory supports this decision. The court may
have considered more than the parties' knowledge of the illegality in
determining their relative positions and their ability to be deterred in the
186. See 6A A. CoR\11", supra note 4, § 1529; see also RFSTATE~IFST (SEcOND) OF Cm.-nL\CTS § 178
comment d ( 1979) ("A party will not be barred from enforcing a promise because of
miS<:onduct that i5 so remote or collateral that refusal to enforce the promise will not deter
such conduct ....").
187. 167 F. 496 (8th Cir. 1909).
188. /d. ar 501.503,510.
189. !d. at 501-02.
190. !d. at 502.
191. ld. at 501.
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future. The plaintiffs assignor was not involved directly in the illegal
transaction. He had little or no control over the illegal situation and so he
would not be in a position effectively to prevent similar deals in the future.
Arguably, the imposition of the nonenforcement rule based upon the
illegality of the related agreement would provide a form of deterrence only
if, in the future, all subcontractors carefully investigate their poten tial
general contractors and refuse to deal with those whose business dealings
had any taint of illegality. If the subcontractors operate in this manner, then
imposition of the nonenforcement rule possibly would deter illegal behavior by general contractors. This form of deterrence, however, only could be
accomplished at a great cost in terms of resources utilized to achieve
deterrence. It is unlikely that imposing this burden on the subcontractor,
who is not an active participant in the anticompetitive agreement, will have
any future deterrent effect on the parties who are considering participating
in an illegal bidding procedure. Potential adverse consequences to unrelated third parties (subcontractors) will have little effect on the proscribed
contract. 192
Finally, the fact that the no-effect rule gives the defendant, who was
directly involved in the illegality, a huge incentive to behave illegally in the
future undermines any deterrence that may result from imposition of this
rule. The defendant would receive a windfall profit if the court denied the
plaintiff recovery because he would reap the benefits of both the illegal deal
and the option to avoid his other contractual obligations if it would be to his
advantage to do so. The relief that the Kansas City court granted the
plaintiff did not provide him with a windfall profit or an incentive to violate
the law because the court simply enabled him to collect the amount legally
owed and prevented him from taking a loss. This disparate potential for a
windfall profit further illustrates that the parties were not on equal footing.
Unequal status, as shown by the defendant's direct involvement in the
illegality and by the windfall he might obtain, makes it more sensible to
impose the loss upon the defendant. Following this analysis, it becomes
evident that the court in Kansas City may have rejected the nonenforcement
rule not because the illegality was collateral, but because the court analyzed
the actual positions of the two parties and realized that because of their
relative status, imposition of the nonenforcement rule actually would
thwart the purposes for which it was designed. Results in other cases that
outwardly rely on the collateralness doctrine also may be explained in terms
of efficient deterrence. 193
192. Another instance in which the collateralness of the contract illegality may warrant
enforcement is Youngblood v. Bailey, 459 So. 2d 855 (Ala. 1984). In that case, the plaintiff
purchased a lottery ticket from an illegal lottery and then resold the ticket to the defendant.
When the defendant refused to pay on the ticket, the plaintiff sued. The defense was based on
the illegality of the contract. Id. at 857-59.
In Youngblood, even if you conclude that you want to deter the plaintiff from participating
in the lotter y rather than the lottery owner, it seems odd to do so in the context of resale. It
is difficult to imagine how parties' participation in illegal lotteries could be deterred by a rule
denying them recovery in the event of a subsequent unrelated transaction. Parties naturally
assume that a one-time breach of lotterv rules would not invalidate all oossible future
, ontr:1cts lkcw'"' ir woukl he ,.,,\rlv t" dC'ter beh:.t1 ior :ts~uuu•d to he "'it hit, h·g;rl norm,, 11
"·ould O<" inc tfir.t·lll to deter l!,!lt.'Tl<'
re~ulat"'" of th<· l.•!ter' trckl't r< ~ 1!c- m;~rket .
19 :~ h.t ~uorlwr C:l'>t' dt· nu..tll,tr~ttnl.( that the tnll,lft·nln~" doetnnt- .d" ·... n be explainnl
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The observation that efficient deterrence is a plausible justification for
the collateralness/inherent illegality distinction becomes even more apparent when one focuses on cases in which courts find the illegality to be
inherent rather than collateral. These cases typically involve parties who
have each played an active and voluntary role in the illegality. In such cases
courts should apply the no-effect rule because both parties are equally
deterrable and it is not worth the cost to shift losses.

v.

FREEDOM OF CONTRACT AND EFFICIENT DETERRENCE

Advocates on each side of the debate about the private vs. public
nature of contracts can justify efficient deterrence. On the one hand, the
socially minded advocate can characterize efficient deterrence as furthering
a normative social policy agenda of courts 194 to maximize efficient deterrence, conserve scarce resources for parties most able to respond to
deterrence, and yet prevent overdeterrence of desirable contractual activitv. On the other hand. the advocate of contractual autonomv might
consider efficient deterrence as vindicating the freedom of contract norm.
If one examines closely the situations and manner in which the courts
apply the doctrine, underlying autonomy concerns become apparent. Many
of the situations in which courts permit recovery involve persuasive barriers
that prevent the parties from allocating costs, through negotiation, to the
superior risk bearer. Thus, when status disparities exist in the employment
context, for example, the employee-the party with inferior status-may
lack access to legal counsel and may, therefore, lack knowledge that the
transaction is illegal. The parties may have different capacities and resources with which to discover applicable rules of law . 195 It is difficult to
in efficient deterrence terms, see Eline Realty Co. v. Foeman, 252 S.W.2d 15 (Ky. 1952). In
that case, a contract provided that Foeman would manage Eline's property in return for
one-half of Eline's profits and commissions. !d. at 16. A dispute arose about how much
compensation Foeman would receive. Eline sought to bar recovery for profits and commissions on the ground that the contract was entered into for illegal tax evasion purposes. The
evasion occurred when Eline transferred a piece of land to Foeman. The profit from the deal
then was taxed at Foeman's lower tax bracket rate and the tax was paid by Eline. Eline's
accountant advised Eline to submit amended returns of Eline and Foeman. The appeals court
n·.wned flint-'< arg\llnt'nt that the $).'it tl gl'<'ll to Foeman ~hould "' 1 as" crerht to redu<"<'
"·hat<.'I er else wa> owing to Fot>man. Tht• cc,uJ~ hdd that the tax t'''"''"ll '' llt'nlt' "'':l\ a ~epar:H<'
transaction from the contract for compensation.
The holding makes sense in terms of efficient deterrence. Since Eline would gain a windfall
profit by receiving Foeman's services for free, that would serve as an inducement to Eline to
enter an illegal scheme which then could be used to defeat legitimate claims for services.
Moreover, because the tax evasion scheme actually benefitted Eline, by reducing taxes
otherwise due, parties like Eline are going w be induced to enter tax evasion schemes to use
as defenses in related actions. Thus, it is more important to deter future Elines than Foemans
since the latter will have no particular incentive to enter the illegal tax evasion scheme (no
taxes of theirs reduced) and, because of the sequence of payment for services rendered.
actually will suffer a loss should the tax evasion scheme invalidate the claim for commissions.
See also Kello~g v. German Am. Ins. Co., 133 Mo. App. 391. 403. 113 S.W. 663. 667 () 908!
lg'r:ll\!Jn" reco,en II> dru~J!:i~r wht• sold mtoxKarm~ ll<tunrs again~t in~urt'r fur pmp('rtl lo~~;
«>ntl'<ll'\ rult- giq:, in(cnrivc to insurer to rak( pr,'mJUms from olkgal <~ntcrpnscs and t< "
remote a contingency w deter bootlegger effectively).
194. See Kornhauser, supra note 34, at 607-09 (discussing normative efficiency claims)
195. Kostritsky, supra note 1. at 936.
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value and allocate a risk of which one is unaware. That barrier may be
exacerbated because parties with superior status often may stand to gain a
windfall profit from the contract's nonenforcement. They, therefore, have
a vested interest in maintaining a differential knowledge of the enforcement rules. In such situations, imposition of a risk allocation on the
cheapest cost avoider. is justified because both parties would have chosen
that allocation to reduce joint costs if each had access to relevant information.
In cases in which the parties trust each other due to an ongoing or
fiduciary relationship, another persuasive barrier prevents the explicit
allocation of risk. In these situations, parties usually believe that explicit risk
allocation is unnecessary. Should the risk arise, they believe that they can
allocate it informally to the superior risk bearer. In such cases, assuming
that parties generally act "to minimize the joint costs," 196 reallocation to
effectuate that goal can be viewed as consistent with their private choices.
In other cases, such as Kansas City, market imperfections exist which
may interfere with the explicit allocation of the nonenforcement risk to the
cheapest cost avoider. For instance, one contracting party may lack knowledge about the illegality. When the subcontractor in Kansas City entered the
contract with the general contractor, nothing was likely tO alert him to the
fact that the general contractor previously had engaged in anticompetitive
activity to secure the contract. Had such information been available, the
partie~ presumably would have allocated the risk of loss to the only party
who knew anything about the illegality, the general contractor. In these
cases, making an unrelated third party police an illegality would cause
extraordinary costs and overdeterrence. Intervention in these cases, therefore, seems consistent with the deal the parties themselves would have
reached in the perfect market. Otherwise, the subcontractor would have to
charge a price the general would not want to pay as compensation for the
extraordinary search costs associated with discovering hidden illegalities in
the deal with the city.
In a case like Karpinski, 197 it is difficult to know whether the facts
demonstrate market imperfections sufficient to interfere with an explicit
allocation of the risk of nonenforcement. In the court's view the farmer
lacked the capacity to bargain freely. Consequently, the farmer might have
hesitated to insist on bargaining to avoid being a troublemaker. That
general hesitation to bargain may have caused the farmer to be reluctant to
bargain explicitly over loss allocation; the farmer may fear that to do so
would jeopardize the deal. If so, then a persuasive barrie r .prevented
explicit and complete risk allocation, the absence of which should not be
considered equivalent to knowing, deliberate risk taking. An alternative
view would argue that if the dairy lacked monopoly power,l9R the offer of
a Grade A contract by illegal means was not coercive. Under the second
view of Karpinski, no market imperfections existed. Both parties were
substantially motivated to ignore the law and acted affirmatively to promote
196. Kronman, supra note 8, at 4.
197. Su snpra text accompanying notes 122-26.
198. See Epsrein . .1upra note 126, at 297-98.
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their own self-interests. Thus, they well could have chosen to allocate the
risk of nonenforcement and their failure to do so represented deliberate
risk taking on their part.
In other cases, no apparent market imperfections exist. Both parties
know of the illegality and actively conspire to further the illegality. In
conspiracies such as in Russel/ 199 or Woodward200 there is no indication that
the parties are involved in an ongoing relationship of trust nor are there
disparities in knowledge of applicable laws. Thus, nothing interferes with
an explicit negotiation over risk allocation. The parties may decide that it is
in their economic self-interest to enter the deal despite the risk of
nonenforceability. Thus, if given an opportunity, they would reach a
bargain in which each party risked the possibility of the no-effect rule to
promote its own self-interest. Assuming each party faces equally fortuitous
losses, courts in those cases should leave the parties where they are on the
theory that both parties are equally superior risk bearers. That rule of
nonintervention can also be rationalized as furthering the autonomy goals
of contract law. A failure to allocate risk reflects a deliberate conclusion that
each should bear the loss equally.

VI.

CoNCLt.:SION

This Article has suggested efficient deterrence as an alternative
method of deciding cases involving illegal contracts. In so doing, it has
articulated a unified theory that explains many of the myriad exceptions to
the no-effect rule currently applicable to illegal contracts. This Article has
urged the adoption of the efficient deterrence theory because it will
preserve limited personal, judicial, and societal resources. Efficient deterrence will promote a judicial approach that takes into account the varying
abilities of people to respond to the doctrine's no-effect rule. The articulation of this theory promotes a reconceptualization of illegal contracts from
an explicitly public doctrine into a doctrine compatible with traditional
autonomy principles. It also will shed light on the fundamental controversy
of modern contract theory between its public vs. private nature.

199. .')9 Cal. App. 3d 633, 131 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1976): .1ee supra text accompanying notes
153-56.
200. 541 P.2d 691 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975); see .mfrra text accompanying nores 90-94.

